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Abstract 
This report investigates the dynamics of a multi-stakeholder platform (named: 
Coordination Group, or CG) for stakeholders of the oilseeds and edible oil value chains 
in Ethiopia. The CG was initiated by the Dutch development organisation SNV in 2005 
as part of a broader programme to improve market access for farmers/producers and 
small - and medium-sized edible oil processing companies. To examine the MSP, both 
its internal, organisational dynamics and its external dynamics, i.e. the changes brought 
about in key areas of the institutional business environment, were analysed. A mixed-
method design was used for the data collection and -analysis, including in-depth 
interviews with 18 key representative edible oil and oilseeds stakeholders participating 
in the CG meetings, document analysis, and a social network analysis. 
Ethiopia has a considerable potential for oilseeds production resulting from its 
diverse and favourable climate conditions as well as the existing large size of 
uncultivated land. Common and speciality Ethiopian oilseeds (safflower, castor beans 
and rapeseeds) are under high international demand due to their organic nature. Despite 
its potential and high international demands, the oilseeds sector in Ethiopia is 
constrained by several factors that can be grouped into production, processing and 
marketing problems. The CG was established to address these major problems.  
The dominant impression is that the CG has played a key role in bringing 
stakeholders from the three societal sectors (public, private and civil society) together to 
participate in a new, loose governance structure that reasonably meets the majority of 
collaboration requirements. Assessments of the success factors in collaboration 
demonstrate mixed results that range from low-high. Generally, the CG has performed 
better in the areas of its internal dynamics than in its external dynamics. Despite the 
fact that oilseeds CG lacks an active nucleus-group; it has introduced and maintained a 
fairly horizontal discussion structure where each member is free and equal –although 
related to capacity differences- to influence and contribute to its internal and external 
dynamics. Lack of active participation of key decision and policy makers in the CG 
meetings is a limitation of the CG to effectively influence the policy arena.   
Assessments revealed that the CG was less successful in terms of its external 
dynamics. Except for its role in creating access to knowledge, the CG performed low in 
terms of creating favourable institutional business environments for small and medium 
sized agri-business players. The CG did not influence access to financing mechanisms. 
Despite its efforts to create international market opportunities, there are few alternative 
market opportunities created for the oilseeds’ value chain actors in general and for the 
farmers in particular.  
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1. Introduction 
Multi-stakeholder platforms1 (MSPs) are increasingly recognized by researchers and 
practitioners as promising mechanisms for stimulating economies in developing 
countries. The so-called chain platforms can help to bring actors, operating directly or 
indirectly in the chain, together and realise common objectives through dialogue and 
cooperation (Vermeulen et al., 2008). An increasing number of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and private enterprises are participating in such platforms, 
however systematic research on their effectiveness and impact is scarce. Therefore, 
Maastricht School of Management (MSM) /Partnerships Resource Centre (PrC) and 
SNV Business Organisations and their Access to Markets (BOAM)-Ethiopia have 
embarked on a collaborative effort to evaluate a number of MSPs which SNV BOAM 
initiated with the aim of developing value chains for the Ethiopian edible oil and 
oilseeds, honey and beeswax, dairy, and pineapple sectors. SNV2 is a non-profit, 
international development organisation, with extensive hands-on experience in their  
value chain approach. MSM’s Sustainable Development Centre3 stands for expertise 
on sustainable economic development in emerging markets. MSM is partner in the 
Partnerships Resource Centre4, an open centre where academics, practitioners and 
students can create, retrieve and share knowledge on cross sector partnerships for 
sustainable development.  
1.1 Research objective and aims 
This edible oil and oilseeds case study assesses the effects of the multi-stakeholder 
platform that was established by SNV BOAM to improve access to (quality) markets for 
stakeholders in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain in Ethiopia. The core of SNV 
BOAM’s approach is to bring primary and secondary value chain actors and other 
stakeholders together to find solutions for identified bottlenecks in the value chain. 
These actors join forces in the so-called Coordinating Groups (CGs), which have a 
multi-stakeholder nature5.  
 The overall objective of the study is to gain insight and generate knowledge on 
how, and under which conditions multi-stakeholder platforms contribute to the 
development of value chains, with a focus on SNV BOAM’s programme (agriculture, 
horticulture) value chains in Ethiopia. Critical success factors and main bottlenecks of 
MSPs for value chain development in Ethiopia are to be identified. In terms of 
contribution the synthesis report of the overall study has three aims. First, the study 
should contribute to the learning process of MSP members and other local Ethiopian 
stakeholders through verification of results and knowledge dissemination. Second, the 
synthesis report should end with recommendations on how SNV BOAM can improve its 
multi-stakeholder processes to increase their contribution to value chain development. 
                                              
1 Comprising of dialogues, policy making, and implementation, the term ‘multi-stakeholder’ is often 
attached to, platforms, processes, and partnerships (Warner, 2006). In this research we refer to multi-
stakeholder platforms when discussing MSPs.  
2 SNV BOAM Ethiopia: www.SNV BOAMworld.org/en/countries/ethiopia/Pages/default.aspx 
3 MSM - SDC: www.msm.nl/1/1/uk/research/sustainable_development_center/ 
4 PrC: www.erim.eur.nl/ERIM/Research/Centres/SCOPE/Partnerships_Resource_Centre/About 
5 Website SNV BOAM & Annual Report 2008 
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Finally, the study should contribute to the academic debate on how value chain 
partnerships can facilitate sustainable competitiveness in developing countries. This 
edible oil and oilseeds case study provides input for all three aims, however, reports only 
on the first aim.  
1.2 Theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional theory, social network theory and collaboration literature has been 
explored to gain insight and generate knowledge on how, and under which conditions 
partnerships (including MSPs) can contribute to changing institutional business 
environments to facilitate the inclusion of small and medium agribusiness players into 
value chains. The effects of the MSPs are examined in terms of their a) internal 
dynamics (basic collaboration, embeddedness and involvement) including a social 
network analysis, and b) external dynamics (the changes in key areas of the institutional 
business environment). The theoretical model is visualized in appendix 1.  
 
(a) Internal dynamics 
From the collaboration literature, the level of engagement of partners, formalized goal 
alignment, shared (decision making) processes and activities, and transparency are 
among the main basic requirements for successful collaboration (Kolk et al. 2008). A 
high level of engagement of stakeholders, proper goal alignment, formalisation, risk- 
and resource-sharing, trust and transparency, shared learning, and joint decision 
making are critical factors for successful multi-stakeholder platforms, particularly when 
these deal with more ambitious and complex issues (Ansell & Gash 2008; Springer-
Heinze 2007, Bitzer et al. 2010, Kolk et al. 2008). 
Collaboration presents the highest strategic level of engagement and implies that 
the partners share risks, resources and rewards (Austin 2007). This also entails a 
formalisation of governance structures, including contractual arrangements to specify 
objectives, activities and responsibilities. Moreover, the relationship between actors 
refers to the range of actors actually participating in the partnership. The value of 
partnerships lies in the potential to create win-win situations if all stakeholders are 
willing and able to contribute to the achievement of goals (Bitzer et al. 2010a). Trust, 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives are generally 
characterised as horizontally organised, with a greater 
degree of flexibility and openness as traditional forms of 
governance. In policy-related documents, MSPs are often 
considered as highly promising alternative forms of 
governance. They are based on the “recognition of the 
importance of achieving equity and accountability”, involving 
equitable representation of stakeholder views, and are “based 
on democratic principles of transparency and participation” 
aiming to develop “partnerships and strengthened networks 
among stakeholders” (Hemmati, 2002:2). 
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risk- and resource-sharing and transparency are indispensable in here, as well as notions 
on power distributions in the value chain MSPs. 
 
In a four-year study of the collaborative activities of as small NGO in Palestine, 
Lawrence et al. (2002) found that inter-organisational collaboration leads to the 
development of new institutions (new practices, technologies and rules). Collaborations 
that are both highly embedded and have highly involved partners, are the most likely to 
generate “proto-institutions”. New rules, technologies and practices arise and are 
diffused beyond the boundaries of the specific MSP contexts, and adopted by other 
organisations in the field: they become proto-institutions. These proto-institutions 
“represent important first steps in the process of institution creation, thus potentially 
forming the basis for broader, field-level change” (Lawrence et al. 2002: 283). They may 
become new institutions if they diffuse sufficiently. Embeddedness describes the degree 
to which a collaboration is enmeshed in inter-organisational relationships (Dacin et al. 
1999; Granovetter 1985). Highly embedded collaborations involve (1) interactions with 
third parties, (2) representation arrangements, and (3) multidirectional information 
flows (Lawrence et al. 2002). In order to examine whether the oilseeds CG has brought 
about changes in institutional fields we investigate not only the relations among 
collaborating MSP members, but also how the collaboration embeds them in the wider 
institutional field. 
 
Involvement focuses on the way in which participating organisations relate to 
each other. According to Lawrence et al. (2002), high levels of involvement entail “deep 
interactions among participants, partnership arrangements, and bilateral information 
flows”. A high level of involvement among participants is necessary for institution 
creation. The internal dimension of partnerships is also explored in terms of the 
intensity of actor involvement. If the involvement of an actor is vital for the functioning 
of the partnership, from design to monitoring, we speak of a high degree of 
involvement. A medium degree of involvement occurs when an actor only participates 
during the implementation stages and fulfils particular tasks. If an actor only 
participates sporadically or not at all, we can speak of ‘no involvement’ (Bitzer et al. 
2010b).  
 
The internal dynamics are verified and complemented with a social network analysis. 
The network approach “allows researchers to capture the interactions of any individual 
unit within the larger field of activity to which the unit belongs” (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003: 
13). A social network analysis describes network characteristics and concepts such as 
embeddedness, social capital, and network centrality. Moreover, a social network 
analysis has the ability to address important aspects of the social structure of a network: 
the sources and distribution of power (Hanneman & Riddle 2005).  
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In the MSP research, the network analysis enabled the researchers to gain insight on: 
 
• The main (core) organisations, stakeholder groups and sectors participating and 
brokering in the MSPs (betweenness centrality); 
• The proportion and types of organisations in the three societal sectors: public 
and private sector and civil society; 
• Visitor patterns (core visitor, regular visitor, irregular visitor, at random visitor); 
• The proportion of visitors that left the MSP series early (exits); 
 
The centrality analysis helps us to understand the overall social structure of the MSP 
networks. Those organizations having the highest scores on betweenness centralities 
(the highest number of ties) in the network are the most central players in the MSP 
networks (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Moreover, more connections often mean that 
individuals are exposed to more diverse information. The more connected actors in the 
network are, the higher the likelihood that they are able to mobilize their resources and 
to bring diverse and multiple perspectives to solve problems. The number and kinds of 
ties actors have determine the range of opportunities, influence and power they have 
(Hanneman & Riddle 2005). “Actors who have more ties have greater opportunities 
because they have choices. This autonomy makes them less dependent on any specific 
other actor, and hence more powerful” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 61).  
Apart from a measure to identify the most central actors, betweenness centrality 
is a measure for the degree that actors connect two other actors that do not have a 
direct link themselves. In our study it refers to the following illustrative situation: actor 
A is present at CG meeting 1 and actor B at meeting 2. If attending both meetings, 
actor C connects A with B. The hypothesis is that C is able to facilitate a flow of 
information from A to B and vice versa. If actors cannot reach each other, or cannot be 
reached by another actor, learning, support or influence between the two is restrained 
(Hanneman & Riddle 2005). Therefore, the higher the number of network players that 
have a high betweenness centrality, the more horizontal the network. Information can 
be diffused through multiple paths, through network ‘brokers’ that are in between other 
network players. The more network brokers there are, the more likely that actors have 
alternative ways of connection to other actors and can by-pass a given (dominant) actor 
(Hanneman & Riddle 2005). With smaller numbers of players with a high centrality, the 
network becomes more hierarchical as fewer players control intermediary information 
diffusion.  
 
(b) External dynamics 
The external dynamics refer to the perceived changes in institutional business 
environment that facilitate inclusion of small and medium sized agri-business players 
into the edible oil and oilseeds value chains. The fragmented nature of Africa’s 
agricultural sector is one of the limiting factors to its development. The majority of 
farmers and SMEs face huge barriers to link themselves to national and global markets, 
while access to these markets is considered critical to growth in developing countries 
(OECD, 2006; World Bank, 2008). The most important institutional challenges to 
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inclusion in commercial value chains concern those formal rules, inter-organisational 
arrangements, and informal customs that prevent farmers and SMEs from having access 
to knowledge & technology, credit, markets, and farmer-based organisations (Bitzer et 
al. 2010b; Van Wijk and Kwakkenbos, 2011).  
Lack of access to capital or credit is a major constraint for many smallholders 
(Altenburg, 2007; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Broader access to financial services 
would expand their opportunities for technology adoption and resource allocation 
(World Bank, 2008). The lack of access to knowledge often hampers agri-food 
enterprises to adopt new practices that build trust and confidence of buyers in the 
quality and safety assurance mechanisms for their produce (Henson and Jaffee 2006; 
Garcia Martinez and Poole 2004). Farmers are exposed to highly volatile markets, 
which hinder investments in the agricultural sector. A more stable market for suppliers 
through buyer commitment and price stability would motivate farmers and SMEs to 
invest in production capacity and quality improvement (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). 
Finally, chain actors, particularly farmers need to be organized to develop capacity in 
terms of supplying volumes and quality, and guaranteeing regular supply. Access to 
organisations facilitates risk sharing, the pooling of resources, enable collective 
learning, and developing market power (KIT et al., 2006).   
1.3 Methodology 
Several methods were used for the data collection process: analysis of existing 
documents (field documents), in-depth interviews and group discussions with SNV 
BOAM in Ethiopia. Both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered. All primary 
data were collected in Ethiopia from August to November 2010, both in the Oromia and 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ (SNNP) Regional States. The research 
was executed in collaboration with a team of local consultants that was especially 
responsible for the interviews and write up of this oilseeds value chain CG report.   
A sample of 18 CG stakeholders was drawn for the interviews in the following manner. 
We selected candidates from participant lists of five Coordination Meetings (begin, end 
and middle) who played specific roles in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain, such as 
chain actors, chain supporters, chain influencers, and chain facilitators6. Some critical and 
reluctant stakeholders were explicitly included. Eventually, interviews were held with 
all relevant value chain stakeholders (Table 1). For a complete overview of the 
interviewees and interview schedule, see appendix 3. For confidentiality reasons, they 
are made anonymous in the report. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
6 For a complete overview of stakeholder roles in the value chain, see appendix 2. 
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Table 1. Interviewees by stakeholder group 
Stakeholder Group Interviewees Percentage (%) Type 
Chain actors 7 39 Input supplier, exporters, cooperative 
unions, and processing companies. 
Chain supporters 3 17 Agricultural Research Centre and BDS 
providers (CG Facilitators and Local 
Capacity Builder). 
Chain influencers 6 33 Ministries, government implementing 
agencies, consumer protection 
association, business representative 
associations. 
Chain facilitators 2 11 An NGO and a multi-stakeholder 
forum (Office for Public-Private 
Partnership on Oilseeds)7 
 
Total 
 
18 
 
100 
 
 
A database was constructed that scores the participation of each organisation in 
each Coordination Group meeting (17 in total), the type and subtype of the organisation 
and its role in the value chain8. Finally, the Coordination Group meeting was attended 
to a) have an idea of the working of the CG in practice, and b) to introduce the 
researchers to the relevant stakeholders in order to promote interview response. The 
questionnaire can be found in appendix 4.  
On the basis of the database, a social network analysis was executed with the 
program UCINET 6.303 which is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social 
networks and other proximity data. The program contains dozens of network analytic 
routines (e.g. centrality measures, dyadic cohesion measures, positional analysis 
algorithms, clique finders, etc.). A social network analysis allows for linking micro and 
                                              
7 The Office of Public-Private Partnership on Oilseeds (PPPO) is a multi-stakeholder platform 
established by public and private actors: The Royal Netherlands Embassy; the Ministry of Agriculture; 
the Ethiopian Pulse, Oilseeds, and Spice Processors Exporters Association; and the Dutch Product 
Board for Margarine, Fats and Oils (a MVO). The partners signed a memorandum of understanding on 
March 5, 2008 and the Office started its activities in early 2009. The partnership is usually referred to as 
the Ethiopia-Netherlands Public Private Partnership on Oilseeds (interview 18). PPPO is engaged in 
high level policy interventions, which are believed to complement the efforts of the CG in implementing 
the five SIPs it had indorsed (Minutes of the 13th Oilseeds CG Meeting, March 12, 2009) 
8 The classification of organizations in type (private sector, public sector, civil society and education), 
subtype (e.g. processing company, producer, consultant, research institute etc.) and value chain role 
(chain actor, supporter, influencer and facilitator) has to be regarded as an analytical tool. In reality, 
there is not such strict distinction, as for example many producer cooperatives (now classified as a 
business representative body in the private sector) are also involved in civil society activities. However, 
their main aim is to represent an economically active producer group and most of the time, the 
cooperatives engage in chain actor activities (e.g. seed production and distribution and buying and 
selling of oilseeds). This is the reason to classify them under the private sector. Another example is a 
university (classified under Education) that acts as a BDS provider as well.  
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macro levels, and an integration between qualitative, quantitative and graphical data. In 
this research, the social network analysis is mainly used to verify the qualitative data. In 
the report, qualitative descriptions are presented, and -if applicable- followed by a 
quantitative check resulting from the network analysis.  
Not all interview questions were propounded to all 18 interviewees. Since we 
were interested in the social mechanisms at work rather than in statistical realities, only 
those having expertise or being knowledgeable on a certain subject were asked on that 
subject. For example, a financial institute might be less knowledgeable on the (technical) 
varieties that exist in the value chain product, or a research institute that has no 
expertise on the contractual agreements that exist between suppliers and buyers. In 
other cases, the respondent had only attended one CG meeting and therefore lacked 
knowledge of CG internal processes over time. Moreover, time pressure indicated by 
the respondent was taken into account during the interviews that lasted on average 1.5 
hours. Although effort was made to propose as many questions as possible to all 
stakeholder groups, conclusions are often based on the views of less than the 18 
respondents. 
The secondary data included content analysis of the BOAM programme, with 
relevant documentation including all Coordination Group meeting minutes and impact 
data on production, income and employment areas provided by SNV BOAM Ethiopia. 
Furthermore, the secondary data include descriptions of the edible oil and oilseeds value 
chain markets, the oilseeds sub-sector in Ethiopia, and relevant aspects of collaboration 
literature and institutional change theory.  
 All interviews were summarized and data were analysed with the qualitative 
analysis software program MAXQDA. Network analysis has been executed for the two-
mode database containing organisations which have attended the oilseeds CG meetings 
in Ethiopia.  
Finally, all outcomes are cross checked, compared to and extended with 
information provided by several key informants to ensure triangulation (e.g. SNV 
BOAM staff, experts, Chain Lead Advisor and Chain CG Leader). 
1.4 Outline of the report 
The report is structured as follows: chapter 2 clarifies the context of this study by 
providing a short background on the oilseeds market and sector, its main constraints 
and SNV BOAM’s strategy of establishing the Oilseeds Coordination Group. In chapter 
3, the internal dynamics of the oilseeds CG are presented. Chapter 4 analyzes the 
perceived changes in the institutional business environment of the edible oil and 
oilseeds value chain, as a result of the MSP (external dynamics). Chapter 5 hints at the 
future outlook of the MSP and the value chain, while chapter 6 and 7 respectively 
conclude with a discussion of results and limitations of the study. 
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2. Context of the case study 
2.1 The Oilseeds Sector 
This section describes a) the international market for edible oil and oilseeds, b) the 
Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds market, c) the Ethiopian oilseeds value chain map, d) 
the main constraints in the oilseeds sector and e) SNV BOAM’s strategy to tackle these 
problems.  
 
(a) International edible oil and oilseeds market 
Edible oil and oil crops are among the widely traded commodities in the world. 
Production and export of oilseeds are however, dominated by a group of producing 
countries. The United States, China, Brazil, India, Argentina, the EU, and Canada are 
the world’s largest producers, which account for about 70 percent of global oilseeds 
output (Hoffman et al., 1999). For example, in 2008-09, EU-27 total oilseeds production 
stood at 27.2 million metric tons while estimated production for 2009-10 stood at 29.6 
million metric tons9 whereas China’s annual total oilseeds production for 2010-11 was 
estimated to be 54.6 million metric tons10. Despite increasing production, erratic 
climatic conditions in many countries in general, and throughout the South American 
continent in particular, have been affecting oilseeds production11. The United States, 
Brazil, Argentina and the EU dominate export market, which account for over 80 
percent of the world oilseeds exports. Despite substantial growth in oilseeds production 
in the past 25 years, and recent gains in export volume, both exporters and importers 
have been engaged in trade distorting policies –such as deferential export taxes and 
production subsidies. As a result, many attempts have been made to favour domestic 
oilseeds production at the expense of imports or to encourage domestic processing of 
imported oilseeds versus imports of oilseeds products. Of course, several major 
initiatives have been undertaken to reduce trade barriers and other trade-distorting 
practices affecting oilseed trade (Hoffman et al., 1999). There are different varieties of 
oilseeds produced by different countries. Commodities’ share of world oilseed 
production shows that soybeans alone account 53.3 percent followed by rapeseed and 
cottonseed each accounting 12.1 percent while peanut and sunflower seed account 10 
and 8.7 percent respectively. Other types of oilseeds account only 3.8 percent (Hoffman 
et al., 1999).  
Demand for vegetable/edible12 oil has consistently been moving up due to 
consistent increase in consumption, which is in turn caused by the increasing population 
as well as increase in disposable income in developing economies. For example, world’s 
vegetable oil production and consumption for 2008-09 stood at around 133 and 130 
million tons respectively. Forecast for 2010-11 shows 145 million tons of production 
and 144 million tons of consumption. China is the largest consumer (around 25 million 
                                              
9 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=154 
10 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=153 
11http://www.oilworld.biz/app.php?fid=1090&fpar=0&isSSL=0&aps=0&blub=99d5d4612ae78dfcf3f26
1cddd2f91a5  
12 Edible and vegetable oil are used interchangeably  
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tons in 2008-09) in the world followed by India. The EU, United States, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Brazil are the other large consumers. The international demand for edible 
oil in 2008-09 was 56 million tons, which is forecasted to grow up to 60 million tons in 
2010-11. Indonesia and Malaysia are the leading exporters of vegetable oil. Argentina, 
Ukraine, Canada, United States and Brazil are other suppliers to the world market. 
Palm oil is the major export for Asian nations while soybean, sunflower and canola 
(rapeseed) oils are major exports for American countries13. 
China is the world's biggest importer of vegetable oil followed by India; EU-27, 
United States and Asian countries are other major buyers. Commodities’ share of the 
world’s edible oil trade shows that palm oil is the internationally most traded vegetable 
oil with more than 60% world market share followed by soybean oil. Sunflower, 
rapeseed and coconut oil are other oils traded in world market14.  
 
(b) Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds market 
Ethiopia consists of different climate zones and a range of altitudes from below sea level 
up to more than 4,500 metres above sea level. This enables it to grow a wide range of 
oilseeds, in which it has a long tradition (Wijnands et al., 2007). Oil crops are the third 
major crops grown with an estimated total cropped area of 740,000 hectares involving 
more than three million smallholder farmers15. Linseed, Niger seed, soybeans, cotton 
seed, sesame, groundnuts, safflower seed, castor beans, and rapeseed are important types 
of oilseeds grown in Ethiopia 16 (Hailegiorgis, 2011). Production is characterized by 
labour intensive, low-input and rain-fed cultivation that results in low yield. For most 
oil crops, except for soybeans, yields are below one ton/ha. Total annual oilseeds 
production is estimated to be only 500,000 - 600,000 tons (Wijnands et al., 2007). There 
is however, high potential for improvement; for most oilseeds productivity per ha can be 
doubled through the use of improved farm practices at smallholder level. The existence 
of large areas of uncultivated and fertile lands offers good opportunities for organic and 
sustainable oilseeds production. Demand for oilseeds is not a problem since 
opportunities for oilseeds export are not fully exploited yet because of inefficient 
marketing, improper cleaning and sometimes poor contract discipline (Wijnands et al., 
2007). Nor have domestic demands been sufficiently met.  
 Oilseeds constitute an important mainstay of the rural economy. The sector plays 
a significant role not only for the rural economy, but also for the national economy at 
large as it represents the second largest export earner next to coffee. Table 2 below 
shows the increasing volume of oilseeds exports and the earnings thereof. 
 
 
 
                                              
13 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=244 
14 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=244 
15 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009 
16 The Oilseeds CG has no special interest in a specific type of oilseed; it facilitates improvement in the 
production and processing of all types of oilseeds (clarification interview with SNV BOAM Lead 
Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 15 March 2011) 
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Table 2 Total volume of oilseeds exports and value of exports (2005-2009) 
Year Export (in metric tons) Value of exports (000’s Birr) 
2005 170,796  1,082,215 
2006 265,649  1,835,270 
2007 234,976  1,654,707 
2008 152,091  2,037,090 
2009 286,987  3.819,429 
Source: Hailegiorgis (2011:7) 
 
Exports actually consist of sesame seed and Niger seed (Wijnands et al., 2007). Ethiopia 
is the third exporter of sesame seed in the world next to India and Sudan. Ethiopian 
sesame seed, which accounts for 75 percent of its total oilseed exports, is well known in 
the world market. Other oilseeds however, have not yet penetrated the international 
market. For example, Ethiopia is the fifth world producer of linseed, but is negligible as 
exporter on the world market17. Nevertheless, it has high potential since linseed and 
other oilseeds production in Ethiopia are close to organic standards (Wijnands et al., 
2007). This is expected to have a positive impact on Ethiopian oilseeds to the European 
market18.  
 Moreover, Ethiopia has an attractive portfolio of high value specialty oilseeds 
such as safflower seed and castor beans. The growing demand for Ethiopian speciality 
oilseeds in the world market and the potential capacity to expand production could turn 
oilseeds into one of the engines of economic growth of Ethiopia. As mentioned earlier, 
soybeans, cottonseed and rapeseed are also important oilseeds grown in Ethiopia. 
However, due to relatively low volumes, low quality and high handling and transport 
costs, it would not be easy for Ethiopia to export these oilseeds and compete on the 
world market. Nonetheless, these oilseeds are important for local consumption 
(Wijnands et al., 2007).  
 Increasing interest in and attention to the oilseeds value chain by the Ethiopian 
government offers another opportunity for the sub-sector to grow. The interest of the 
government is reflected by its intensified efforts to come up with a master plan for the 
development of the sub-sector. Such attentions are due to the sector’s contribution to 
the growing export earnings, sources of food, energy and ingredients of animal feed19. 
Generally, the edible oil and oilseeds value chain has a major role in the Ethiopian 
economy with links to agriculture, agro industry, trade (import and export) and is 
interlinked to the service economy20.  
In terms of edible oil, Ethiopia is highly dependent on foreign sources; either 
from aid or import21. Palm oil from Malaysia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates 
dominates import markets (Wijnands et al., 2007). Edible oil supply from Ethiopia's oil 
                                              
17 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009 
18 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009 
19 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009 
20 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009 
21 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009 
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factories is less than 20 percent of the total consumption of the country22. The domestic 
edible oil production is characterized by backward technology where most of the 
oilseeds are crushed locally without any refining. More than 1,000 small crushers 
(mostly with Chinese/Indian machines) are operational on village level. These local 
crushers have limited capacity with low hygiene standards. Only a few larger crushing 
or refining companies seem to have adequate safety and hygiene standards compared to 
European industry standards (Wijnands et al., 2007). Therefore, there exists a huge 
potential to work on import substitute activities23.   
 
(c) Oilseeds value chain map 
Figure 1 shows the Ethiopian part of the global oil crops value chain, with indicated 
intervention areas, as visualized by SNV BOAM. SNV BOAM identified four major 
interventions areas that include Seed Supply, Seed Cleaning and “True-to-Type”, 
Milling Technology, and Coordination between Oil Millers and Exporters24. These 
intervention areas were presented to and adopted by the participants of the first 
Oilseeds CG meeting25. From the view point of value chain analysis, the interventions 
are comprehensive and cover input, production, processing, and marketing aspects. The 
intervention areas mainly address the exporters, processors and farmers’ organisations 
with the aim of improving linkages between mid-chain buyers and producers. The value 
chain map visualizes options for individual farmers to sell oilseeds directly to retailers, 
local (traditional) oil millers, producers’ cooperatives, wholesalers, and even to 
exporters. 
 
                                              
22 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009 
23 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009 
24 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005 
25 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005 
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Figure 1. Edible Oil and Oilseeds products value chain map with indicated intervention 
areas 
 
Source: Minutes of the First Oilseeds Coordination Group Meeting, 30 September, Addis Ababa 
 
(d) Constraints in the Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds sector  
Despite the vast opportunities and a number of comparative advantages, the edible oil 
and oilseeds sector has several constraints to its growth. The constraints are related to 
production, processing and marketing issues. Oilseeds production is limited by several 
problems that are related to backward agricultural practices; lack of awareness, high 
costs and limited accessibility of inputs (particularly improved and variety seeds)26; lack 
of credit facilities; and uncertainty about economic returns. The fragmented landholding 
system is also a critical problem; there are a limited number of large commercial farmers 
(> 100 ha) whose share is less than two percent (Wijnands et al., 2007).    
As discussed earlier, processing is dominated by traditional and small crushers 
characterized by very inadequate capacity and low hygiene and safety standards 
(Wijnands et al., 2007). They are engaged in crude (unrefined) oil production. The 
paradox is that oil mills and refining plants are heavily under-utilized; only 30 to 40 
percent of their full capacity is used due to the lack of sufficient oilseeds (Wijnands et 
al., 2007). Chronic shortages in supply of oilseeds have been known to limit the 
operations of the edible oil industry27. The supply of oilseeds is seasonal and hence, 
processors are required to procure high stock of oilseeds during peak production season 
and store for year round operation.  This results in high working capital and makes the 
edible oil business expensive28. Moreover, the edible oil industry is confronted with high 
                                              
26 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009 
27 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009 
28 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009 
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competition from imported vegetable oils in general and palm oil in particular 
(Wijnands et al., 2007).    
Market information is not widely available and infrastructure is generally weak 
in Ethiopia. The situation for the oilseeds sector, however, is critical. Sixty percent of 
the oilseeds is traded by 10 percent of the largest traders and 80 percent of the small 
traders have a share of 20 percent (Wijnands et al., 2007). On top of this monopoly by a 
few traders, the market is concentrated in Addis Ababa which undermines accessibility 
of the market to producers. In 2006, a survey conducted by SNV BOAM in 10 oilseeds 
market cities indicated that 50 percent of the major market for oilseeds is in Addis 
Ababa, with approximately 50 main traders and over 300 wholesalers. This is three to 
four times higher than those in the other nine cities. Many smallholder producers are 
located far from Addis Ababa and hence, they depend on brokers29 to sell their produce 
(Wijnands et al., 2007). Adulteration of oilseeds is another constraint that has affected 
both edible oil processing companies and exporters30.  
 Primary data collected from the edible oil and oilseeds value chain stakeholders 
revealed multiple constraints, which include those discussed above. Table 3 presents a 
summary of the main constraints identified by interviewed stakeholders. The 
constraints are categorized as general, production related, and processing related issues. 
According to the interviewees (Table 3) lack of direct linkage/contractual agreement 
and mistrust between producers and processors/exporters is a key constraint. As a 
result; the oilseeds’ market is dominated by brokers who deliberately distort prices, 
which lead to volatile and unpredictable price structures. Twelve of our interviewees 
indicated that producers and processors have insufficient access to affordable capital due 
to rigid collateral requirements. This has undermined the opportunities for improving 
production and processing technologies. According to the interviewees, low quality 
concern among producers and processors is widely prevalent and has affected the 
development of the sector. This is aggravated by lack of sufficient attention from 
government policy makers. There is general lack of regulatory standards for edible oil 
and oilseeds. This has encouraged adulteration of edible oils and oilseeds. Moreover, 
lack of policy attention is reflected by the fact that, unlike cereals and other crops, there 
is no sufficient research effort to improve the productivity and quality of oil crops 
except for sesame that received attention due to its long standing contribution to 
foreign earnings (interviews 5, 6, 13, 14, and 16). The government’s policy of duty and 
VAT31 free import of vegetable oil (palm oil) is also considered as a bottleneck for the 
development of local edible oil processing companies/millers (e.g. interviews 9, 11, 14, 
and 17). An expert from the Consumers’ Protection Association however, indicated that 
the government has to regulate high price of local edible oil through such policy 
because of the limited capacity of local processors to meet domestic demands (interview 
8).   
                                              
29 Brokers are those traders who buy oilseeds from collectors (those buying form farmers) and sell to big 
traders and processors  
30 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009 
31 Duty is a tax imposed on import and export of commodities while VAT is a tax imposed on any value 
added transaction in the production and commodity exchange processes 
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 On the production side, the sector is dominated by smallholder farmers who 
suffer from low yield/productivity and volatile prices. As a result, oilseeds are 
considered as secondary crops among smallholder farmers. Moreover, there is limited 
technological support, training and input supply to improve productivity and interests 
of the farmers in oilseeds production. Lack of differential farm gate price32 is another 
constraint that undermined the need for and effort in improving the quality of oilseeds. 
In fact, absence of differential price encourages adulteration of oilseeds (interviews 5 and 
16).  
 Regarding issues related to processing, backward processing technology, duty 
and VAT free import of palm oil, shortage and seasonal supply of oilseeds, adulteration 
of edible oil, and insufficient training to oil mill workers are the main problems. The use 
of backward processing technology has resulted in inefficient production and sub-
standard products/crude oil. Oilseeds are usually available in the market during harvest 
season and hence, in non-harvest season processing companies are forced to operate 
below capacity.  
 
Table 3. Main constraints in the oilseeds sector in Ethiopia per stakeholder’s group and 
number of times indicated by the interviewees (frequency) 
Constraints in oilseeds sector                                                                      Frequency 
General 
Lack of direct linkages/contractual agreements between producers and 
processors/exporters 
14 
Lack of access to sufficient capital   12 
Low quality concern  among producers/processors and lack of regulatory 
standards for edible oil and oilseeds 
11 
Lack of sufficient attention by policy makers (except for sesame) 7 
Insufficient research efforts 5 
Insufficient infrastructure  2 
Lack of awareness among consumers about quality of edible oil 1 
Production related issues  
Oilseeds not a primary crop                                                                                                        14 
Volatile and low prices paid to farmers due to broker dominated markets 11 
Poor quality and adulteration of oilseeds 8 
Lack of technology and input supply 8 
Insufficient training 7 
Poor agronomy practices 7 
Limited commercial farming 2 
Lack of price differentiation at farm gate (quality is not rewarded)  2 
Poor linkages between seed providers and seed producers 1 
Lack of attention by investors                                                                                                                  1 
Processing related issues  
Backward  processing technologies 9 
Duty and VAT free import of vegetable oil (palm oil) 6 
                                              
32 Farmers are paid the same price regardless of the differences in the quality of the oilseeds they have, 
hence, they are not encouraged to invest in quality improvement  
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Shortage and seasonal supply of oilseeds  5 
Adulteration of edible oil 5 
Insufficient training 2 
 
(d) SNV BOAM strategy in the BOAM framework 
To tackle these problems in the oilseeds sector, SNV BOAM developed the ‘Support to 
Business Organisations and their Access to Markets’ (BOAM) programme33. Under this 
programme, a Value Chain Development (VCD) approach was developed that is 
“characterized by (i) a combined sector and business to business (B2B) orientation” (IOB 
Inception Report, 2009: 27), (ii) a focus on ‘pull’ factors; working from the middle of the 
value chain at both ‘up-stream’ and ‘down-stream’ levels (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, 
February 2011), (iii) “a firm direction towards the private sector (private businesses) as 
the entry point, (iv) the use of multi stakeholder processes in the form of Coordination 
Groups as the platform for decision making and anchoring of the local ownership, (v) 
the use of local consultants or capacity builders to increase outreach, sustainability and 
ownership and (vi) the use of leverage and innovation funds” (IOB Inception Report, 
2009: 27). Therefore, the MSP approach is only one part of the whole ‘holistic’ SNV 
BOAM value chain approach. 
 The BOAM programme is based on the idea that change can only be induced if it 
builds on knowledge and experience already present in the concerning sectors. 29 
agricultural value chains were surveyed on the basis of ‘what was already there in the 
sector’. On the basis of a set of criteria, eventually six priority chains were chosen out of 
these 29, including the oilseeds and edible oil; dairy; honey and beeswax; and pineapple, 
mango and apple value chains. Establishing the CG was only a logical step in the 
process of bringing together all the relevant knowledge and experience of stakeholders 
in the concerning value chains34. 
SNV BOAM sees the CG as the main organ for governance and coordination of 
chain activities and stresses the importance of ownership through the formation of 
stakeholders’ own network.  
                                              
33 SNV BOAM’s programme, financed by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Addis 
Ababa and until the end of 2009 by the Irish Embassy, contributes to sustainable poverty reduction in 
rural Ethiopia through value chain development. The overall BOAM programme period is five years, 
and started from September 2005. The programme aims at improving the access to markets for small 
and medium agribusiness players along selected value adding chains (SNV BOAM programme proposal 
2005-2010). In 2009 a transformation process of the BOAM programme into a centre of excellence for 
value chain development has started in the form of BOAM2 scaling up phase. Some key chances are the 
emphasis on Business to Business (B2B) value chain development and the up-scaling of both production 
as well as a new fund structure. The additional target of the BOAM program up-scaling phase is to 
develop, test and introduce innovative approaches that aim to improve business to business relations in 
selected value chains (SNV BOAM annual report 2009). A one-year extension of the BOAM programme 
was requested and approved, until August 31, 2011, to maximize the results to be obtained from the 
BOAM programme (BOAM 2 programme proposal 2010-2011). 
34 Clarification meeting SNV BOAM, 8 November 2010 
22 
 
Apart from BOAM, SNV runs 
2 other value chain programmes 
(PSNP plus & RAIN)35. Finally, the 
four case studies under study are 
only part of the impact areas, (sub) 
sectors and programs of SNV 
BOAM Ethiopia. 
2.2 The Edible Oil and Oilseeds 
Coordination Group 
Ethiopia has considerable potential 
for oilseeds production for which 
there are steady international and 
domestic demands. The sector, 
however, suffers from proper 
steering mechanisms and key 
stakeholders operate in an isolated 
manner. In 2005, the SNV BOAM 
program established a forum called 
the Edible Oil and Oilseeds 
Coordination Group aiming at 
addressing the gap in the 
governance of the sector.  
 
From the network analysis we found 
that in total 101 different 
organisations attended the oilseeds 
CG meetings 1-17 from 2005-
201036. 
 
The CG consists of representatives 
of key actors in the edible oil and 
oilseeds value chain (regional, 
national and sporadically 
international), including:  
• Farmers’ cooperative unions 
such as the Didea Farmers’ 
Cooperative Union, 
Rayawakena Farmers’ 
Cooperative Union,  Ambo 
                                              
35 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009 
36By the end of 2010, already 19 meetings took place for the oilseeds value chain CG. Nevertheless, the 
social network analysis was based on 17 meetings due to the participation lists in the meeting minutes 
that were made available to the researchers at start of the research project in June 2010. 
Characterising the CG 
The Oilseeds CG is primarily appreciated for 
bringing together multiple actors (producers, 
processors, exporters, government agencies, 
consumer protection association, chambers of 
commerce, consultants, and experts) representing 
multiple interests and sectors (public, private and 
civil society). 
The majority of the interviewees describe the 
oilseeds CG as a centre/platform of learning and 
communication/networking between 
participating stakeholders without which they 
could hardly meet and engage in common 
agendas –identifying problems and seeking 
solutions for the oilseeds sector problems.  
Members learned not only from the exchange of 
their experiences but also from presentations of 
research findings that consist of new and 
innovative ideas. For example, members are 
exposed to a totally new idea of growing olive 
trees and producing olive oil (interviews 8, 12 16, 
and 17). Members have exchanged contact 
addresses and established networks to facilitate 
the search for inputs and market. For example, 
cooperative unions have been able to sell their 
produce directly to processors through contacts 
they established at the CG (interview 5). 
Interviewees generally, believe that the oilseeds 
CG has substantially reduced unilateral 
operations of key stakeholders and fostered 
synergetic relations. 
Interviewees are, however critical on the type and 
commitment of participants in the CG meeting. 
They believe that key government decision 
makers are not attending CG meetings and hence, 
its policy impact remained low. Moreover, 
frequent rotation of participants is common that 
demanded CG meeting facilitators to make long 
briefing before starting new agendas of the day so 
that new participants are on board; such a practice 
is however, boring for those who attended 
previous meetings (interview 8). 
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Farmers’ Cooperative Union,  and Biftu Selallie Farmers’ Cooperative Union; 
• Processors’ Association that include the Addis Ababa Oil Millers’ Association; 
• Private processing companies for example, Addis Mojo Edible Oil Complex S.C, 
Kana Industry PLC, Samirawit Oil Mill Factory, and  Bezu Edible Oil; 
• Consumers’ Association that includes the Ethiopian Consumers’ Protection 
Association; 
• Federal Government authorities, including the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
and Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) ; 
• Regional Government agencies for example, the Oromia Cooperative Promotion 
Bureau and Oromia Seed Enterprise; 
• Research institutions such as Holleta Agricultural Research Centre;  
• Local Capacity Builders and other BDS providers like Edge Consult and 
Agonafir Consult; 
• Representatives of private business associations, for instance, the Ethiopian 
Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association (ECCSA); Addis Ababa Chamber 
of Commerce (AACC); Adama Chamber of Commerce; and the Ethiopian Pulses, 
Oilseeds, and Spices Processors and Exporters Association (EPOSPEA); 
• Banks and Micro finance institutes (MFIs), for example, Abyssinia and Awash 
International Banks and the Dynamic MFI; and 
• NGOs such as SNV, Growing Ethiopian Market, Facilitator for Change Ethiopia, 
Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance.  
 
Under its BOAM programme, a Value Chain Leader and a Value Chain Facilitator is 
selected for each value chain CG. The Value Chain Leader is chosen by the CG and acts 
as the focal person who should guarantee the local ownership of the CG and who is 
representing the CG. Ideally for SNV BOAM, a Chain Leader represents a key private 
sector organisation in the chain. The managing director of Agro Prom International 
PLC and ex-President of the EPOSPEA was elected as a leader of the edible oil and 
oilseeds CG in 2005 at its first meeting. Until the time of data collection for this 
research, he was in this CG leadership position. The Chain Leader is supported by value 
chain development advisors or coaches, who add distinct expertise to the program (agro-
processing, organisational strengthening, women entrepreneurship/gender and 
monitoring and evaluation). In addition, SNV BOAM makes available a Value Chain 
Facilitator to facilitate and activate communication amongst CG members and to 
disseminate information. From CG meeting 2-14, the owner and the manager of the 
organisation Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services 
(BCaD) served as Chain Facilitators in the oilseeds value chain, next to their facilitation 
activities in the honey and pineapple value chain CGs. From meeting 15 onwards, this 
role has been taken over by the managing director of Edge Consult. BCaD was replaced 
by Edge Consult, among others due to complaints from the Oilseeds Value Chain 
Advisor on missing files in the chaos of an overflow in funding applications37.  
                                              
37 Interview BCaD, August, 2010  
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The Oilseeds CG conducted its first meeting on September 30, 2005 and since 
then the CG has been conducting its meetings on quarterly basis (four times a year). In 
general, the meetings have the following pattern: the CG Facilitator and Leader open 
the meeting with a recap of the previous meetings, participants introduce themselves, 
fund utilization reports are discussed, experts present about new researches and 
technologies related to the oilseeds sector and Question and Answer Rounds are held in 
between. The first CG meeting started in English, but currently Amharic is the main 
language used in the meetings. The Facilitator translates when necessary. A 
representative of the Addis Ababa Oil Millers Association however, argues otherwise; 
the Facilitators are keen to give attention to foreign participants. They encourage 
discussions in English and try to translate into Amharic, which is not in the best 
interest of many stakeholders in general and those representing unions in particular 
(interview 9). 
Following the recommendations of the Mid Term Review (Aleme et al. 2008) an 
Executive Committee for the evaluation of concept notes/funding proposals for the 
BOAM designated funds was established. Next to this, SNV BOAM has assignment 
contracts indicating capacity building interventions with all clients (i.e. processors, 
farmer organisations, business associations, and government). Finally, a new funding 
structure was introduced.  
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3. Oilseeds Coordination Group Dynamics 
This chapter is meant to present the main findings regarding the internal dynamics that 
took place within the oilseeds CG meetings 1-17 (2005-2010). The oilseeds CG is 
assessed on the basis of basic collaboration requirements, and the levels of 
embeddedness and involvement.  
 
       
Picture: Minutes of the 6th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 12 January 2007, Addis Ababa 
 
3.1 Basic Collaboration Requirements 
The extent to which the oilseeds CG meets basic collaboration requirements is 
examined by assessing so-called success factors. An overview of all these factors is 
provided in Table 4 below.  
 
Table 4. Basic collaboration requirements and their success factors 
Basis collaboration 
requirements 
Success factors  
3.1.1 Level of engagement (a) Commitment  
(b) Motivations  
(c) Roles and contributions 
(d) Shared resources 
3.1.2 Jointness (a) Decision making  
(b) Selection of stakeholders  
(c) Agenda setting 
(d) Distribution of benefits 
(e) Risk sharing 
3.1.3 Transparency (a) Accountability 
(b) Trust building 
3.1.4 Goal alignment (a) Clear objectives 
(b) Win-win opportunities 
(c) Compelling case 
Source: Compilation based on Kolk et al. (2008), Van Tulder & Pfisterer (2008) and Bitzer et al. (2010).  
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3.1.1 Level of engagement 
Success factors identified in the research for the level of engagement are fourfold: (a) a 
high level of commitment, (b) intrinsic motivation, (c) clarity of roles and contributions, 
and (d) resource sharing.  
 
 (a) Commitment 
Establishing the edible oil and oilseeds multi-stakeholder platform is a core component 
of SNV BOAM’s program in which SNV BOAM plays a facilitating role38. SNV BOAM 
promoted and facilitated the establishment of the oilseeds CG to enable stakeholders to 
take the lead in the sector in such a way that internal commitment can be generated for 
sustainable development of the sector (interview 17). Table 5 below presents the degree 
of commitment of CG members as evaluated by the interviewees.  
 
Table 5. Level of commitment evaluated 
Commitment Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Low 1 8 
Medium 12 92 
High 0 0 
Total 13 100 
Source: interview data 
  
The database shows that, from the sampled interviewees, only SNV BOAM has 
attended all the 17 oilseeds CG meetings. A public sector agency was classified as 
‘regular’ as it participated in 15 of the 17 CG meetings. Eleven of the sampled 
interviewees were classified as ‘irregulars’ (present in at least three meetings with a 
maximum presence of 12 meetings) and four as ‘at random visitor’ (participating in 1, 2, 
or 3 meetings).  
An overwhelming majority rated the degree of commitment of the CG members 
as ‘modest’ (92%) while only one interview rated it as ‘low’ (8%) and none of them rated 
as ‘high’. This reveals that there is not even a small group of members who is highly 
committed; hence, the CG suffers from absence of an active nucleus group. This problem 
is attributed to different factors. Absence of a strong and committed private sector 
company like that of Beza Mar in the honey CG is a core problem39. Unlike Beza Mar 
that invested its time and resources in a synergetic effect in the CG’s activities, 
members of the oilseeds CG expect a great deal from SNV BOAM. Another factor is 
SNV BOAM’s insufficient attention and support to the oilseeds CG40. Low resource 
allocation and delays in fund release procedures are indicators of this. Usually, funds 
allocated to the oilseeds value chain are lower than funds allocated for other value 
chains such as the honey CG, nonetheless, this is also related to different capacities 
among members to articulate their needs (see also section 3.1.2.e) . Fund release 
                                              
38 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005 
39 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011 
40 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011 
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procedures are characterized by an inordinate delay. For example, there were cases 
where stakeholders were only able to receive their funds two years after the concept 
papers were approved. This has created discontent among the CG members that 
affected their interest and commitment to the CG41. Notwithstanding the satisfaction of 
the majority of the respondents with the agenda setting processes, SNV BOAM’s lack of 
interest to include agendas other than those stipulated in its programme is another 
factor that affected the emergence of highly committed nucleus-group42. A 
representative of processors association stated that an “active nucleus-group cannot 
surface in a situation where agendas are confined within a pre-defined program that was 
designed by a donor –SNV”.43 Moreover, SNV BOAM’s heavy influence in decision 
making processes is considered a disincentive for other members in the front to play the 
role of an active nucleus-group44. Two of our respondents to this question indicated that 
in relative terms, producers, consultants and Chain Lead Advisors are more committed 
than exporters, processors and government agencies (interview 10 and 17). Another 
interviewee stated that processors are also well committed (interview 4). “In general, 
members do not equally value the importance of the CG to the development of the 
sector” (interview 18).   
According to the overwhelming majority of the interviewees, participation of 
members in the CG is characterized by frequent rotation and irregular attendance, 
which is an indication of lack of high commitment. This corresponds with the database 
analysis which shows that the oilseeds sector scores highest on the number of exits 
(71.2 percent). “The oilseeds CG cannot be successful with participants who attend the 
CG meeting only once” (interview 16). Many of the oilseeds CG members neither 
regularly attend CG meetings nor effectively carry out assigned tasks (interviews, 6, 7, 8, 
12 and 18). Several stakeholders, particularly government organizations, usually send 
different persons to attend the different CG meetings, which hardly ensure continuity of 
ideas and common understanding. Every new participant raises issues that have been 
discussed in the previous CG meetings. The briefings absorbs time and ultimately 
crowds out the agenda of the day (interviews 6 and 7). The oilseeds CG Leader stated 
that the CG is forced to unduly deal with similar unfinished business in every meeting 
as a result of lack of commitment among CG members to carryout assigned tasks 
(interview 12). Members of the Policy Issues Ad hoc Committee -who have been 
assigned to study the impact of VAT and duty free import of palm oil, are good 
examples in this regard. The issue has remained a subject of discussion in every CG 
meeting since the Committee is not working effectively (interviews 11, 12, and 15). A 
business association representative who rated CG members’ commitment as ‘low’  stated 
that members are active simply in discussing the problems, but are not active and 
committed to seek solutions (interview 9). In the meeting room, members pretend to be 
committed; most of them however, do not look back to their assignments after they have 
left the meeting room. As result, the CG could not effectively implement its decisions 
                                              
41 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011 
42 Clarification interview with a representatives of a processors association , 23/03/2011 
43 Clarification interview with a representative of a processors association , 23/03/2011 
44 Clarification interview with a representative of a  private company, 23/03/20111 
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and plans (interviews 9, 11 and 15). A representative of a private company is in fact, of 
the opinion that most of the members do not care about the success of the CG (interview 
14). Generally, considerable effort remains necessary from all stakeholders to have the 
CG effectively play its role in addressing the problems of the oilseeds sector (interview 
4).  
 
(b) Motivations 
Responses from interviewees indicate that members were triggered to join the CG 
either by one or a combination of the following factors: i) the business opportunities it 
provides, such as meeting new buyers and suppliers (interviews 4, 5 and 11); ii) the 
incentives provided by SNV BOAM as it has been inviting participants45 and offers 
technical and financial assistance (interviews 4, 7,  9, 10, 11, and 14); iii) the learning 
opportunities the platform offers and its overall role in promoting the oilseeds sector 
(interviews 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16);  and iv) personal interest (interviews 6, 12, and 
16). An interviewee representing a public-private forum indicated that his organization 
was motivated to join the oilseeds CG since the CG’s objectives coincide with its own 
objectives (interview 18).  The Chain Advisors, the Local Capacity Builder and the CG 
Facilitators were contracted by SNV BOAM and their motivations to join were linked 
to job opportunity creation (interviews 6, 15 and 17). The Local Capacity Builder 
however, indicated that, as a professional, he has always been aspiring for a change in 
the oilseeds sector; therefore, he was enthusiastic to join the CG since he believed it 
would offer him an opportunity to contribute his best to the sector’s development 
(interview 6). Some of the interviewed members pointed out that other organisations 
have tipped them to join the oilseeds CG (interviews 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16).  
Most of the interviewees were clearly asked whether the DSA paid by SNV 
BOAM to CG participants had an influence on their motivation to participate. They did 
not consider DSA as a motivational factor. Nevertheless, a couple of interviewees did 
not want to rule out its impact on some of the participants (e.g. interview 5). According 
to SNV BOAM’s Oilseeds Value Chain Lead Advisor, DSA is an important factor to 
ensure participation. Without DSA, members from remote areas will not be able to 
attend the CG meetings as they require compensation for transportation and 
accommodation costs. He believes that DSA might be crucial not only for those 
travelling from remote areas but also for others. For example, after SNV BOAM’s 
announcement in the 18th oilseeds CG meeting that it will end DSA contribution (Birr 
60) to each participant, the number of participants has sharply declined. The 19th 
oilseeds CG meeting was attended by 25 participants (including the first author), which 
is less than half of the participants of the previous meeting (54 participants) (interview 
17). However, this is probably not related to decrease in DSA but to bad planning of the 
meeting.  
 
Generally, motivations of the members to participate are related to both intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors, but mainly extrinsic related to SNV BOAM’s invitation to attend 
                                              
45 About 66% of the interviewees  learned about the CG from SNV BOAM’s invitation 
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and aspirations for business opportunities and incentives provided by SNV BOAM. The 
dominant perception is that the DSA could be considered as precondition to sustain 
participation, but not a fundamental triggering factor for members to join the oilseeds 
CG. 
  
(c) Roles and contributions 
The CG has defined its roles and contributions to the oilseeds sector in its first meeting, 
based on the first Strategic Intervention Plans (SIPs) presented by SNV BOAM46. The 
CG however, did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each and every 
individual member. Moreover, the CG suffers from absence of accountability 
mechanisms (see section 3.1.3). Besides, due to the high number of participating 
organisations (101 organisations in total in all oilseeds CG meetings) and the high 
rotation of members and organisations, operational plans agreed in several CG meetings 
are not representing all participating parties. A representative of a private company 
argued that operational plans do not represent the interests of all parties not merely 
because of large number of participants but also due to the dominance of SNV BOAM in 
the planning process. No matter how actively stakeholders participate, “key decisions 
are in the hands of SNV BOAM” (interview 14).  
 
(d) Shared resources 
It can be concluded that resources are shared in the sense that each CG member has an 
equal opportunity to have access to financial and technical support delivered through 
the SNV BOAM funding programme47. However, the benefits to be obtained from this 
support are not equal (see next section).  
The oilseeds CG represents multiple sector (public, private and civil society) 
actors whose degree of engagement to the CG appears to be homogenous. As discussed 
earlier, an overwhelming majority (92%) of the interviewees indicated that members are 
only ‘modestly’ committed while the remaining interviewees rated it as ‘low’; hence, the 
oilseeds CG lacks an active nucleus- group (for reasons discussed in section 3.1.1./a) to 
play a ‘steering role’. Participation of the members in the CG can be attributed to both 
intrinsic and extrinsic factors, but largely to the latter. DSA is not a decisive 
motivational factor for members to join the CG, but necessary precondition for poorly 
capacitated regional organisations. 
 
In the network analyses on course ratio these findings on stakeholder engagement were 
verified. To analyse the course ratio of the oilseeds CG participation database four 
categories of visiting frequency of organisations have been determined (core visitor, 
regular visitor, irregular visitor, random visitor) as well as four categories of entry and 
exit behaviour of the organisations (present & stay, present & exit, entry & stay, and 
                                              
46 Minutes of the 1st  Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005 
47 In the beginning of the SNV BOAM programme (2005) the three types of funds accessible were the 
leverage fund, the research and study fund, and the financial intermediation fund. In line with the 
recommendations of the Mid-Term Review in 2008, the three new types of funds are the Sector 
Development Fund, the Pilot B2B Fund, and the Up-scaling Support Fund.  
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entry and exit). The descriptive statistics of both categories are calculated for the 
oilseeds CG participation database and displayed in Appendix 5. A legend is attached. In 
Table 6, the visitor frequency in the oilseeds CG is presented. In Table 7 the total of 
exits from the oilseeds CG is demonstrated.  
 
Table 6 Visitor frequency in the oilseeds CG (%)  Table 7 Total of exits48 
Sector Core 
visitors 
Regular 
visitors 
Irregular 
visitors 
At 
random 
visitors 
Oilseeds 1,0 2,0 44,6 52,5 
 
The social network analysis confirms that: 
 There is irregular attendance of organisations in the oilseeds CG meetings 
(Table 6). The proportion of core visitors (present at all meetings) and 
regular visitors (present at 14, 15 or 16 meetings) is modest. Only SNV 
BOAM represents a genuine core visitor (present at all 17 meetings); 
 There is high rotation of organisations in the oilseeds CG meetings. With 
71.2 percent, the oilseeds sector scores highest on the number of exits 
compared to the other CGs (Table 7 and synthesis report); 
 In the oilseeds CG, the percentage of at random visitors (present at 0, 1, or 
2 meetings) is high (52.5 percent) (Table 6). Rotation of organisations and 
participants was especially underlined by the interviewees in the oilseeds 
value chain CG. 
3.1.2 Jointness 
The success factors identified in this case study to measure the level of ‘jointness’ in the 
CG meetings are: (a) decision making, (b) leadership, (c) selection of stakeholders, (d) 
agenda setting, (e) distribution of benefits, and (f) risk sharing. 
 
(a) Decision making  
The degree to which decisions are jointly made in the oilseeds CG was difficult to 
measure, as formal decisions are rarely made in the CG (see also section 3.1.3). Only a 
few moments of more formal decision making could be identified, and all were related to 
electing the nominees for certain positions in established committees. Examples are the 
election of the CG Leader in meeting one, the election of members of the Ad hoc 
Committee for Policy Issues in meeting 8, and the elections of members for the Oilseeds 
CG Executive Committee in meeting 12. All interviewees pointed out that every CG 
member has a free and equal vote in such decisions.  
Interviewees were asked whether all members have an ‘equal say’ not only in the 
committee election processes, but also in all discussions in the CG, or whether some 
members are ‘more equal than others’?  All of them (Table 8) stated that every member 
has an equal chance and is free to express his/her opinion in the CG meetings, ensured 
                                              
48  Total exits = present & exit + entry & exit (see also Appendix 5) 
Sector % 
Oilseeds 71,2 
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by the proper steering activities of the Facilitators. Nor is there any entry barrier to join 
the CG (interview 12). A representative of a processing company described the CG as 
“the most democratic forum where each and every member is free and equal” (interview 
11). Nonetheless, interviewees revealed that participants with profound knowledge and 
expertise capture larger shares of the discussions time in the CG meeting.  For example, 
quite often, researchers, advisors, consultants, and experts take more time from which 
other members learn (interview 17). None of the interviewees has complained about such 
practices as the learning processes benefit all. 
All interviewees except one believed that planning and other issues that involve 
decision making are based on ‘consensuses’. A representative of a private company who 
had different view in this regard stated that though every member has an equal chance 
to speak out in the CG, “decisions are influenced by the ideas of SNV BOAM” (interview 
14).   
 
Table 8. Equal say 
Equal say Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Yes 15 100 
No 0 0 
Total 15 100 
Source: interview data 
 
SNV BOAM has made attempts to share some of its own responsibilities in respect of 
the edible oil and oilseeds value chains to create more ‘ownership’ of the CG process 
with stakeholders. Such an initiative emanated from the Midterm Review of the SNV 
BOAM Program (Aleme et al., 2008). Its main initiatives were the establishment of the 
Executive Committee for the evaluation of concept notes regarding BOAM designated 
funds and the assignment of contracts between SNV BOAM and its clients (including 
CG members) on capacity building interventions. In the meetings, joint Strategic 
Intervention Plans49 and operational plans were formulated. According to what was 
recommended in the MTR the CG’s Executive Committee should empower the sector in 
general and the CG in particular by giving stakeholders a say in the allocation of its 
oilseeds sector related funding. Moreover, the establishment of the Executive 
Committee helps to strengthen the relationship between the various stakeholders within 
the sector, and also serves as a phasing out strategy for SNV BOAM50. 
 
                                              
49The following Strategic Intervention Plans were agreed with the oilseeds CG members in meeting 12: 
1) improved seed multiplication for planting material at farmers’ level; 2) training on good agricultural 
practice in oil crops (GAP) and food oil processing; 3) promoting value addition on local processing 
industries with refining, bottling and processing of more valuable products like shortenings and 
margarine; 4) improving market information system through networking; 5) and fight adulteration of 
oilseed from inert materials 
50 Minutes of the 12th  CG Meeting, 9 December 2008 
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 Financial ownership was created, to variable degree, in the following ways. First, 
the Executive Committee has full authority to evaluate, approve or reject funding 
proposals where SNV BOAM’s role would be limited to give technical advice on concept 
notes that have been accepted by the executive body51. Second, the SIPs and operational 
plans were adjusted in response to CG members at least two times, but that was already 
prepared in a preliminary stakeholder workshop with oilseeds value chain 
representatives identified by SNV BOAM. A representative of a private company is of 
the opinion that SNV BOAM is less ready to compromise the contents of its programs; 
therefore, the role of CG members in the formulation of SIPs and other operational 
planning is mainly limited to an act of endorsement (interview 14).   Third, the oilseeds 
Executive Committee was effective only for a very limited time period (only since 2009) 
(interview 17).  Fourth, SNV BOAM itself remains modest about the ownership that was 
created in this way. “Having the Executive Committee decide on fund proposals was 
only a ‘cosmetic measure’: a small shift of ownership” (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, August 
2010). Finally, as the CG meetings were not formally required under the MSP, there 
was no formal joint decision making on financial issues.  
 In sum, although it was always SNV BOAM that decided on the final budget 
spending, decisions made in the CG or by its Executive Committee were never bypassed 
by SNV BOAM (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, January 2011). After the Mid-Term Review in 
2009, SIPs were revised and oilseeds stakeholders were slowly able to change the SIPs 
in the direction they preferred.  
 
b) Leadership 
The majority of our interviewees believe that the CG Leader is strong and visionary. He 
is acquainted with the sector both as a professional and as a businessman (interview 17). 
The CG Leader confirmed that he has both professional and business interest and 
knowledge to lead the CG (interview 12). “Without the CG Leader who volunteered and 
committed himself to lead the CG ever since its establishment in 2005, the oilseeds CG 
would not have reached the stage where it is now.”52 The CG Leader however, was not 
able to direct the sector towards modernization compared to that of the honey CG 
Leader. In spite of his professional and business interest, he did not invest sufficient 
time and resources to explore alternatives for the development of the sector other than 
SNV BOAM’s support (anonymous). The honey CG Leader had exerted efforts to 
explore possibilities for support beyond the SNV BOAM program. For example, the 
establishment of Ethiopian Apiculture Board and EU accreditation of Ethiopian honey 
are primarily his own initiatives to which he had invested his time and resources 
(anonymous). The oilseeds CG Leader stated that neither CG members are highly 
committed to carry out assigned responsibilities effectively, nor are EPOSPEA and the 
Oil Millers’ Association strong and active to support the CG. For him, these are 
disincentives to exert extra efforts. Many of the respondents shared the view that these 
associations are weak to provide leverage to the CG. 
 
                                              
51 Minutes of the 12th CG Meeting, 9 December 2008 
52 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011 
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(c) Selection of stakeholders 
Except for the beginning, stakeholders are not randomly selected. Their profession 
(processor, producer, exporter, researcher, BDS provider, etc.) and their possible 
contributions (e.g. input supply, processors with good relations with farmers etc.) to the 
CG are important criteria in the selection procedure (interview 17).  Participants are 
mainly selected and invited by SNV BOAM in collaboration with the Chain CG Leader 
and Facilitator. The CG Facilitator is mostly active in facilitating the selection 
processes (correspondence) than in actual selection (identification of participants) as the 
latter is mostly performed by the SNV BAOM Chain Lead Advisor (interview 15).  The 
SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor however, discusses and decides with the CG Leader or 
at least the Chain Lead Advisor informs the CG Leader about newly identified 
participants before the invitation is sent (interview 12). Most of the interviewees 
indicated that they learned about the CG from SNV BOAM, who invited them to 
participate through the CG Facilitator (e.g. interviews 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13).  
Organizations tipped by other organizations on the CG, were able to secure their 
invitation after a discussion on their interests with the SNV BAOM Chain Lead Advisor 
(interviews 4, 7, 10 and 14). The invitation database builds on the previous meetings 
attendances (interview 15).   
Almost all interviewees indicated that the CG Facilitator sends invitations to 
members at least one week in advance of the next CG meeting (next meeting date is 
usually fixed by CG members in the previous meeting)  via e-mail, fax or telephone. The 
CG Facilitator sends out a package per email or fax (no regular post mail) to each 
participant that includes the invitation letter, the agenda of the meeting, and a summary 
of about two pages on the previous meeting (not the full meeting minutes). Though the 
CG Facilitator reminds participants by telephone on the meeting dates, participants that 
have no email or fax addresses to receive the meeting agenda in advance miss the 
opportunity to anticipate and prepare on the meetings’ agenda. This is quite common 
for producers’ cooperative unions, which have neither easy access to e-mail nor to fax 
services (interviews 4 and 5). An interviewee missed one meeting as a change in the CG 
meeting date was not well communicated to every participant (interview 9) 
Changes in the SNV BOAM programme coordinating staff considerably 
influenced the new CGs invitation policy.  “The first CG was developed from scratch 
and it was SNV BOAM who gathered all relevant stakeholders together”53, and the first 
BOAM coordinator insisted the number of participants should not exceed 30-35. 
However, from meeting nine (end of 2007/beginning of 2008) the value chain Lead 
Advisors -headed by the second BOAM coordinator- started inviting many participants 
(often over 60 participants), aiming at broad based information dissemination. This 
prompted SNV BOAM to look more critical at the engagement processes within the 
coordination group54. Invitation became more regulated with only one participant from 
each organisation receiving DSA. Less relevant and non-motivated participants were 
                                              
53 Discussion group SNV BOAM, August 12, 2010. 
54 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009 
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removed from the participation lists, although this did not happen often according to 
the CG Facilitators. 
 
(d) Agenda setting 
The SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor, the Chain CG Leader and Facilitator are key 
players in the agenda setting processes. Most agendas are drawn from the previous CG 
meeting agendas. According to the Chain CG Leader and Facilitator, members can 
incorporate issues in the CG meeting agendas only if supported by the majority of the 
CG members. This is, however, not explicitly stated in the invitation letter nor is there 
any practical exercise that could be referred to in this regard (interviews 12 and 15). A 
representative of a business association has his reservations; organizers (Chain Lead 
Advisor, Chain CG Leader and Facilitator) do not include agendas other than those 
stipulated in the SNV BOAM programme. For example, access to large investment 
capital (foreign loans) and technological support to the processing industry (modern oil 
refinery) were important agendas his organization brought in, but were not accepted by 
organizers. This was merely because the agendas were considered to be beyond the 
SNV BOAM program. In his opinion, the CG has only addressed issues that fall within 
the SNV BOAM framework (interview 9). Another interviewee had another concern 
related to the agenda; often discussions are pre-occupied with one of the agenda items 
and moderators are incapable to cover the whole agenda (interview 18).    
 
Table 9. Agenda setting evaluated 
Satisfaction Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Low 0 0 
Modest 2 14 
High 12 86 
Total 14 100 
Source: interview data 
 
Interviewees’ overall evaluation of the agenda setting processes shows that an 
overwhelming majority (86%) is highly satisfied. Insufficient capacity of the CG 
Facilitator to guide though agenda items and lack of interest from organizers to include 
agenda items that go beyond the SNV BOAM framework were critical limitations 
identified by interviewees (interviews 9 and 18). 
 
(e) Distribution of benefits 
In its first meeting, the oilseeds CG explicitly identified the benefits expected from the 
joint forum and efforts. The benefits are streamlined into five key result areas55 from 
which the main stakeholders (producers, processors and exporters) would directly and 
                                              
55 The key result areas include the quality of the existing supply is improved; yield potential of oil seed 
crops under production improved; oil extraction and refining process is improved; the use of edible oil at 
rural level improved through small micro oil extraction enterprises; and coordination within the value 
chain is improved 
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indirectly benefit56. All respondents to this question indicated that, in principle, every 
CG member has equal access to all types of benefits (the benefits interviewees are 
referring to are mainly related to SNV BOAM’s financial and technical supports). 
Nevertheless, interviewees’ overall assessments of benefits and the way they are 
distributed among CG members show that none of them believe that benefits are 
distributed equally (Table 10). Practical benefits depend predominantly on the capacity 
of each CG member to bring forward a concept paper or funding proposal that meets 
the requirements of the SNV BOAM program (e.g. interviews 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15). 
Members who actively participate in the CG meetings create fertile grounds for 
enhanced benefits (interviews 6). The majority of the interviewees believed that members 
with greater capacity and an active participation attitude have benefited to greater 
extent whereas members with frail capacity have benefited little or none.  
An interviewee -who is member of the Executive Committee-argued that 
available funds were not optimally utilized due to low capacity of the majority of the CG 
members to prepare proposals that could meet with SNV BOAM’s criteria (interview 16). 
Other interviewees confirmed that available funds were not fully utilized. This is 
however not only due to weak capacity of the CG members, but also due to rigid and 
slow bureaucratic fund release procedures of SNV BOAM (interviews 12, 14 and 18).  
One interviewee for example, stated that “it is close to one year that the proposal 
submitted by his company was approved by the Executive Committee of the CG, the 
fund however, has not yet been released” (interview 14). SNV BOAM’s Chain Lead 
Advisor confirmed that delays are common (up to two years)57.  
Inconsistent proposal assessment procedures are other bottlenecks for an equal 
distribution of the benefits. The Chain Leader had received complaints from several 
members that requirements or conditions for the SNV BOAM capacity building support 
proposal are not uniformly applied, i.e. some proposals have been accepted on the basis 
of a bare minimum requirements while others have been required to fulfil all the 
requirements stringently (interview 12). Another interviewee shared the CG Leader’s 
observations. He stated that the Executive Committee and SNV BOAM did not apply 
uniform standards/requirements for accepting or rejecting funding proposals. Members 
that have good relationships with SNV BOAM have been able to easily secure grants no 
matter what the quality of the proposals was (interview 18).  
According to the Chain Lead Advisor, the CG cannot be responsible or credited 
for ensuring ‘equal distributions of benefits’. It was only recently that the CG, through 
its Executive Committee, began to exercise decision making that involves allocation of 
benefits (appraising and deciding on funding proposals). Before the Executive 
Committee, such decisions were under SNV BAOM’s mandate. Hence, so far, the CG’s 
role in distribution of benefits was marginal. For the Lead Advisor, in the context of 
SNV BAOM, distribution of benefits does not depend on the decision making body but 
on the capacity of the beneficiary. The program is basically demand driven; hence, the 
                                              
56 Minutes of the 1st  Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September, 2005 
57 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011 
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benefits depend on the capacity to demand and to meet clearly stipulated requirements 
(interview 17).   
 
Table 10. Equal benefits 
Equal 
benefit 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Yes 0 0 
No 14 100 
Total 14 100 
Source: interview data 
 
(f) Risk sharing 
The last indicator of jointness in the CG, the extent to which risks are shared between 
CG members in the meeting, appeared not very relevant, as resources are mainly brought 
in by SNV BOAM. CG members risk little in the meetings except their own time. In the 
edible oil and oilseeds value chain, uncertainties and transaction costs in production and 
marketing that members have to endure due to lack of information might have been 
diminished as a result of relationships created in the CG (see also next section).  
 
The degree of jointness of the CG members and the mutual independence among them 
are important measures for the level of ‘jointness’ in the MSP. Despite an interviewee’s 
criticism on SNV BAOM’s dominance in decision making, the overall data gave the 
impression that the CG leadership at least intends to let the MSP function in a 
horizontal manner. In the meetings, members have an equal chance to speak out. Except 
for one interviewee the remaining interviewees are satisfied with CG governance. The 
majority of the respondents believe that decision making is on the basis of consensus. 
Nonetheless, not all stakeholders have the ability to articulate their needs/demand; only 
those who push their issues through in previous meetings can influence the CG agenda 
and the benefits thereof. The CG’s centre of gravity remains with the leading trio 
including the Chain CG Leader, CG Facilitator and  the SNV BOAM Lead Chain 
Advisor, with the sitting SNV BOAM programme coordinator as a significant 
influencer at the background.  Findings revealed that not only the CG’s centre of 
gravity remains with the leading trio, but also prevalence of unequal power distribution. 
The fact that some agenda points forwarded by members were not accepted, and that 
proposal requirements were not uniformly and equally applied demonstrate lack of 
unequal power distribution.  
 
In the social network analysis, betweenness centrality was among others used to 
identify the most central actors in the network. As stated before, those organizations 
having the highest scores on betweenness centralities in the network are the most 
central players in the MSP networks. In Appendix 6, the top-10 central network players 
of the oilseeds CG are presented in tables. Their organisational type (private sector, 
public sector, civil society, or education), subtype (i.e. processor, producer, financial 
institute, business association, implementing agency etc.) and their stakeholder role 
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(actor, supporter, influencer and facilitator) in the value chains were taken into account. 
The following regarding jointness was confirmed in the social network analysis: 
 
 SNV BOAM is a central network player in the oilseeds CG (Appendix 6). 
This corresponds with their leading role as an initiator of the whole 
program and the oilseeds CG; their involvement in agenda setting and 
selection of stakeholders, and their final decision in financial affairs; 
 The oilseeds Chain Leader is visible as a central player in the oilseeds CG 
(Appendix 6). This confirms his active position in the oilseeds network; 
 The Chain Facilitator is visible as a central player in the oilseeds CG 
(Appendix 6); 
 In the first nine meetings (till January 2008), about 25-35 participants can 
be observed in each meeting (participation databases), corresponding with 
the invitation policy of the first BOAM coordinator. After meeting nine, 
often over 50 participants -including several members of the same 
organisation- can be observed (participation databases). This corresponds 
with the invitation policy of the value chain Lead Advisors headed by the 
second BOAM coordinator. 
 
To identify and compare the genuine ‘information brokers’ –who are in between other 
network players and control information diffusion- in the oilseeds network, only those 
organisations with a normalized betweenness centrality higher than 2, 3 and 4 were 
taken into account in this part of the analysis58. In Appendix 6 the central players with a 
betweenness centrality higher than 2, 3 and 4 are presented. 
 
Regarding ‘information brokerage’, the network analysis confirms and complements 
that: 
 
 SNV BOAM plays the role of information broker in the oilseeds CG, 
confirming its dominant position as MSPs initiator (Appendix 6); 
 Differences in the absolute and relative numbers of ‘information brokers’ 
are not spectacular, nevertheless, we can derive that the oilseeds network 
is relatively more horizontal compared to the other CGs as relatively more 
participants control information diffusion (synthesis report) 
 Measuring a betweenness centrality higher than 2, the oilseeds CG is most 
horizontal compared to the other CG’s; information is diffused through ten 
identified information brokers, almost 10 percent of all participating 
organisations (synthesis report); 
 Measuring a betweenness centrality higher than 4, both SNV BOAM and 
the Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia are central network players in 
the oilseeds network (Appendix 6). 
 
                                              
58 The cut-points 2, 3 and 4 are arbitrary 
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3.1.3 Transparency 
The degree of transparency of the CG in undertaking its activities is modestly high, as 
reflected by the views of our interviewees. The meetings are open to public (although 
more restricted towards the 18th meeting), and meeting summaries, agendas and other 
documents are shared with stakeholders. All CG documents could be downloaded from 
the former SNV BOAM website, although several links appeared to be dead and not all 
documents were available. Not only its current activities but also the future of the CG is 
openly discussed. The issue of succession or handing over the CG from SNV BOAM to 
stakeholders has been discussed since meeting 14. In this meeting, four candidates -the 
Ethiopian Pulse, Oilseed and Spice Exporters Association; Addis Ababa Oil Millers 
Association; Oil Board; and Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association- 
were nominated by the CG meeting participants to take over the responsibility59. The 
Oil Board did not exist at that time and hence, was eliminated from the candidacy. The 
three remaining candidates were assessed based on a matrix of criteria identified by the 
CG meeting participants. The evaluation revealed that ECCSA fulfilled most of the 
criteria and was selected to take over the responsibility60. The ECCSA accepted this role 
and declared its commitment and readiness. Though SNV BOAM planned to handover 
the responsibility from the 15th CG meeting, no concrete steps have so far been taken by 
the ECCSA towards assuming its role61. A representative of the ECCSA indicated that 
his organization is still willing to take over and has started the necessary preparations. 
 Success factors assessed under transparency were (a) accountability, and (b) trust 
building.  
 
(a) Accountability 
Formal accountability mechanisms are absent in the oilseeds CG. Except for the Chain 
Leader, Chain CG Facilitator and other contractors with SNV BOAM (i.e. Local 
Capacity Builders and other BDS providers) none of the stakeholders participating in 
the CG has been assigned formal duties and responsibilities. Due to the lack of formal 
task assignments and accountability mechanisms, the majority of members working in 
different committees of the CG did not carry out their responsibilities effectively. After 
they left the CG meeting, they ’forget’ on their assignments; consequently, the next CG 
meeting is preoccupied with the same issue. Therefore, the CG could not move forward 
in discussing new agendas (interviews 11, 12, and 15).  
 Nevertheless, several forms of informal accountability are present (pers. comm. 
SNV BOAM, February 2011). For example CG members only receive SNV BOAM 
funds if their proposals are in line with the SIPs identified by stakeholders in the 
oilseeds value chain. In addition, members need to present their fund utilization reports 
in the CG meetings, in front of all other critical and reflecting stakeholders. 
 
(b) Trust building 
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Without the oilseeds CG, the multiple stakeholders (processors, producers, exporters, 
experts, consultants, and researchers) brought together would experience difficulties to 
discuss the oilseeds’ problems and search for solutions. On top of the plenary 
discussions, the CG organizes and facilitates working groups (e.g. meeting 1, 3 and 12) 
and bilateral discussion forums to improve stakeholders’ involvement and to foster 
communication and networking. Working groups were assigned to discuss on specific 
issues (how to promote value addition, market information and networking, fight 
adulteration of oilseeds and edible oil, etc.) and to present plenary on their results. CG 
members are also deliberately encouraged by the Facilitators and Chain Advisors to 
have bilateral discussions and to exchange contact addresses (e.g. between producers 
and processors, producers and exporters, producers and experts, processors and experts, 
etc.) during lunch and coffee breaks. Interviewees appreciated the role of these 
interactive processes in promoting trust and a ‘sense of complementarities’ between 
stakeholders (e.g. interviews 5, 9, 10, and 12).  
Only occasionally exchange of contact addresses and the network thereof have 
resulted in direct transactions between producers and processors (interviews 5 and 9). 
Nevertheless, the degree of trust is no yet sufficient for efficient transactions between 
the chain actors. Cooperative unions, processors and exporters are not comfortable yet 
with farmers. They are of the opinion that farmers are not loyal to buyers (interviews 4, 5 
and 14).  “Though the Union is trying its best to help farmers through the provision of 
inputs (improved seeds), farmers scarcely remain trustworthy to the Union” (interview 
5).  
3.1.4 Goal alignment 
Goal alignment by stakeholders is considered to contribute to the effectiveness of 
collective goal-setting processes, which, in turn, positively influences the success of the 
MSP. Strong goal alignment and goal visibility allows for more effective execution of 
the SIPs identified in the process. Goal alignment is measured by assessing the success 
factors (a) ‘clear objectives’, (b) ‘win-win opportunities’, and (c) a ‘compelling case’ as 
driver of the MSP. 
 
(a) Clear objectives 
The primary objective of the CG is to serve as a platform for discussion, dialogue, 
capacity building, information exchange, and knowledge transfer between stakeholders 
in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain62. SNV BOAM has broadly defined the formal 
objective of the CG as promoting efficient and equitable linkages for the economically 
active poor along the agricultural value chain63.On top of this, the CG helps participants 
to identify needs and with formulating requests for support from SNV BOAM. Based on 
the experiences gained during the pilot phase, SNV BOAM identified the following 
                                              
62 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September, 2005 
63 An observation out of the secondary data is that the aim has gradually been shifting from ‘creating 
linkages’ towards ‘creating ownership in the sector’. The third BOAM program coordinator endorses 
this strategy towards a long term vision for the CG. 
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important SIPs for the scaling up phase64: improved seed multiplication for planting 
material at farmers’ level; training on good agricultural practice in oil crops and food oil 
processing; promoting value addition on local processing industries with refining, 
bottling and processing of more valuable products like shortenings and margarine; 
improving market information system through networking; and fight adulteration of 
oilseeds from inert materials. In order to promote the shared objective and as well as to 
create ownership, SNV BOAM presented these SIPs to members at the 12th CG meeting 
for approval65. Though members had little input into the SIPs, they had indorsed them 
and expressed their commitment to effective implementation (interview 17). With the 
above SIPs, SNV BOAM fine-tuned its program and the CG’s overall focus on 
improving the scarcity of improved seeds and supply of oilseed for oil extraction and 
export business66. 
 
(b) Win-win opportunities 
Do the members feel that the CG facilitates a win-win situation for all? Previous 
discussions (in the section on risk sharing) revealed that CG members risk little except 
their time whereas opportunities in principle (in the section distribution of benefits) are 
equal for every member.  Actual benefits however, depend on the capacity of each 
member and those members with limited capacity have less chance to benefit from SNV 
BOAM’s capacity building support. Previous discussions however, revealed that benefits 
depend not only on the capacity of members, but also on the nature of their 
relationships with SNV BAOM, i.e. members who have  good relationships with SNV 
BOAM are said to have had secured benefits despite the quality of their funding 
proposals. Nevertheless, the win-win opportunity of participation in the oilseeds CG is 
not restricted to SNV BOAM’s support; learning and networking are also important 
objectives from which every member could benefit.  
  
(c) Compelling case 
Is the edible oil and oilseeds CG driven by a ‘compelling case’, i.e. an important need 
that can be best fulfilled through an MSP and that is recognized and accepted by all 
members?  
Almost all interviewees indicated that the edible oil and oilseeds sector was in 
complete ‘disarray’ before the establishment of the CG. It was characterized by 
fragmented and backward production, processing and marketing systems. A 
representative of a government implementing agency stated that “change in the 
performance of the oilseeds sector is only possible through multi-stakeholder process 
that assembles all relevant actors” (interview 16). One of the greatest contributions of 
the CG recognized and appreciated by all interviewees is the opportunity it has created 
for stakeholders in the sector to unite and identify, discuss and seek solutions for the 
problems that have been affecting the development of the sector (e.g. interviews, 6, 8, 10, 
11, 12, 15, and 17). “The CG created an opportunity of which I dreamed for long, both as 
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a professional (agronomist) and as a businessman (exporter)” (interview 12). “Before the 
CG, many of our research results were shelved as there was little or no forum to share 
and disseminate the results. Indeed, forums like the CG are indispensable in 
disseminating research results to organized farmer representatives and the farming 
community at large” (interview 13).  
Therefore, stakeholders in the oilseeds sector were eager to have access to 
forums like the CG. Nonetheless, the CG by itself can barely address the substantial 
problems of the sector and the high expectations of the stakeholders. Processors for 
example, expect the CG to play a key role in technological transfer (financial support to 
buy a modern edible oil refinery) while producers expect the CG to create sufficient 
access to improved seeds and market opportunities (domestic and international). 
Paradoxically, CG members do have neither sufficient resources nor commitment to 
improve the performance of the CG in meeting their expectations67.  
3.2 Embeddedness 
To assess the degree to which the oilseeds MSP is enmeshed in third organisations, we 
assessed its inter-organisational relationships through (a) the origin of the participants’ 
link with the CG (was the motivation to join brought about by another organisation?), 
(b) the extent to which the MSP contributed to new professional organisations’ 
memberships, (c) the involvement of participants in multiple MSPs, (d) relations with 
the government, and (e) SNV BOAM’s inter-organisational embeddedness as a result of 
its MSP activities.  
 
(a) The original link to the oilseeds CG 
About one third of the interviewees identified that inter-organisational relationships 
have been supportive in linking and motivating them to become a member of the CG for 
the oilseeds value chain (interviews 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16). The following examples 
illustrate the role of inter-organizational relationships in linking members with the CG. 
Rayawakena Farmers’ Cooperative Union was motivated to join the CG through the 
information it obtained from the Ambo and Didea Farmers’ Cooperative Unions 
(interview 4). Addis Alem Trading learned about the CG from the Women’s Exporters 
Forum (interview 10) while ERA Agrolink PLC joined the CG through information 
obtained from another organization, i.e., the Office of Public Private Partnership on 
Oilseeds (interview 14). The Oromia Cooperative Promotion Bureau was linked to the 
CG through a consultant who had worked with SNV BOAM (interview 7).  
 
(b) Access to new professional organisations’ memberships 
The majority of the interviewed participants believed the CG did not support members 
to access new professional organisations (e.g. interviews 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 11). Two of the 
interviewees however, pointed out the active role of the CG in the establishment of the 
Office of PPPO in which several CG members (such as ECCSA, MoTI, EPOSPEA, and 
MoA) are participating (interviews 2 and 18).  
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(c) Involvement in multiple MSPs 
Several organisations are active in multiple MSPs. They are members of the four value 
chain CGs (honey, dairy, oilseeds, and pineapple). The Chamber of Commerce and 
Sectoral Association, Bank of Abyssinia, Consulting Management Business Creation and 
Development Services, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, and the Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia are good examples. 
The actors involved in multiple MSPs transfer information and contacts from one MSP 
to the other to the benefit of the members, and enhance the general networking 
opportunities for them. In this way they contribute to the effects of each MSP. 
 
(d) Relations with the government 
In spite of the fact that oilseeds are the third major crops grown in Ethiopia and 
constitute the second most important source of foreign earnings, the sector did not 
receive sufficient policy attention. Unlike cereal crops, there has been no sufficient 
research in the sector (interviews 13). The CG however, has promoted and demonstrated 
the role of the sector in the fight against poverty and in ensuring sustainable 
development. This encouraged policy makers to increase interest and attention to the 
sector (interviews 1 and 3). The PPPO has improved the interest in and attention given 
to the oilseeds sector as well (interview 18). MoTI and MoA for example, have shown 
their keen interests to support the sector through market promotion and research 
respectively. MoTI’s primary attention is however, directed towards export than the 
overall development of the sector (interview 3). Due to an increasing interest in and 
attention to the oilseeds sector created by the CG and the PPPO, the Ethiopian 
Government has come up with a master plan (covering the period 2008-2015) for the 
development of the sub-sector68. 
 
(e) SNV BOAM’s network 
SNV BOAM is not the sole donor involved in the VCD approach, but is embedded in a 
broader international development network. The most prominent organisations with 
value chain development programmes are the German GTZ, Oxfam GB, and the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy (RNE), which support the dissemination of best practices among 
donors, government institutions and practitioners. The Government of Ethiopia has 
also adopted the sectoral and value chain approach. Growing Ethiopian Market, 
Facilitator for Change Ethiopia, and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance are 
other NGOs which are linked with SNV BOAM through the CG. These links of SNV 
BOAM embed the CG members in the wider institutional field. 
 
Discussions in this section revealed that the oilseeds CG is fairly embedded in inter-
organisational relationships. Interactions with third parties are evident, resulting in 
multidirectional information flows facilitated through the identified brokers of the 
network. Moreover, the oilseeds CG has played an important role in the establishment 
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of a parallel MSP –PPPO, which is involving multiple organizations. This enhances 
public-private partnerships in the oilseeds sector.  
 
In the social network analysis, the following regarding relations established with the 
government were confirmed: 
 
 The Ministry of Trade and Industry is among the central network players 
in the oilseeds CG (Appendix 6), confirming MoTI’s interests to support 
the sector (through market promotion and research); 
3.3 Involvement 
In this case study, the intensity of actor involvement was assessed through (a) 
individual/sector representation in the CG and (b) participation in CG-related 
committees. The findings were verified in the social network analysis. 
 
(a) Representation 
The question whether all relevant stakeholders are represented in the oilseeds CG was 
forwarded to 15 of the 18 interviewees. The majority of them (87%) believed that 
representation in the edible oil and oilseeds CG was incomplete (Table 11).  
Three of the interviewees (interviews 5, 14 and 11) indicated that regional and 
federal research institutions are not sufficiently represented; only recently (2009) one 
research institute - Holleta Agricultural Research Centre - has started participating in 
the CG. In addition, Federal Cooperative Unions and brokers are important 
stakeholders that have not been included (interviewees 8 and 17). 
Eight out of the 15 interviewees replied yes and no to the question (interviews 6, 
7, 10, 13, 15, 16, and 18). Yes, because, institutionally, all relevant stakeholders are 
represented in the CG. No, because government agencies are represented by frequently 
rotating experts who do have little or no leverage in government decision making and 
policy processes. Their overall assessment is that the CG is not complete in the real 
sense of representation.  
The lack of government involvement is a specific issue that SNV BOAM 
considered from the outset. The Mid Term Review (Aleme et al. 2008) states: 
“involvement and commitment from the public sector is crucial in order to achieve the 
strategic objectives of the BOAM programme. The public sector is already involved and 
experienced the positive effects of the BOAM approach and is interested to continue 
with the practical relation. The rejection of the public development program69 however, 
hinders the development of better and more structural relationships. More importantly, 
the connection with the higher forums and senior management of relevant public 
agencies and departments needs to be structured for which new arrangements are 
necessary.” Discussions in section 3.2(d) revealed that the Ethiopian Government has 
started to develop an interest in the oilseeds sector due to the CG’s efforts to 
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demonstrate the role of the sector in the overall economic development in general and 
in poverty reduction in particular.  
 
Table 11. Representation oilseeds CG 
Representation Frequency Percentage 
(%) 
Complete 2 13 
Not complete 13 87 
Total 15 100 
Source: interview data 
 
(b) Participation in CG related committees 
The establishment, membership and participation in (steering, ad hoc) committees and 
working groups are indicators of actors’ involvement. The participants of the oilseeds 
CG have established several spontaneous working groups on several issues in the 
meetings (meetings 1, 3 and 12) (see also section 3.1.3 b). The CG has also established the 
Policy Issues Ad hoc Committee (meeting 8) and an Executive Committee (meeting 12). 
The two committees have created opportunities for members to engage in the CG 
activities. Despite serious limitations in achieving its objectives, the Policy Issues Ad 
hoc Committee consists of public, private and civil society sector representatives, 
including MoTI, MoA, the Bankers’ Association, ECCSA, the Oil Consortium, and SNV 
BOAM70. The Oilseeds CG Executive Committee also involves a number of 
participants.  Three of the members represent federal and regional government agencies 
while four of them represent private organizations and business associations71.  
 
The social network analyses on sector representation and central network players 
generally support these findings (derived from Appendices 5 and 6). In Table 12 and 13 
respectively the sector representation in the oilseeds CG and the number of central 
network players from each sector are represented. Finally, in Table 14, the central 
network players per stakeholder role in the oilseeds value chain are displayed.  
 
Table 12. Sector representation in the oilseeds CG in percentages (%) 
Sector Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Education Civil 
society 
Unknown 
Oilseeds 60,4 17,8 6,9 14,9 0,0 
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Table 13. Top-10 central network players in the oilseeds CG per societal sector 
 Oilseeds 
Private 5 
Public 4 
Civil Society 1 
Education 0 
Total 10 
 
Table 14 Top-10 central network players per stakeholder role in the oilseeds value chain 
 Oilseeds 
Actor 2 
Supporter 3 
Influencer 4 
Facilitator 1 
Total 10 
 
From the network analysis, the following was confirmed: 
 
 SNV BOAM’s private sector approach is evident; the majority of the 
participants in the oilseeds value chain CG represent private sector 
organisations (Table 12). Moreover, half of the central network players are 
representatives of the private sector (Table 13). ;  
 All stakeholders’ roles in the value chains are represented in the lists of 
central network players of the oilseeds CG (Table 14). This indicates that 
value chain roles (chain actors, -supporters, -influencers and -facilitators) 
of the whole chain approach are represented in the networks; 
 Financial organisations (i.e. banks, MFIs) are absent as central network 
players in the oilseeds CG (Appendix 6). 
 The Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia is among the central network 
players in the oilseeds CG (see also section 4.3).  
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Table 15. Oilseeds CG Ethiopia: internal and external dynamics 
Internal dynamics 
I.  Collaboration  
1.1 Engagement  
Commitment Homogenous group of medium committed members. Absence of active 
nucleus- group to ‘steer the wheel’ is a critical problem.  There is no strong 
private company to take the lead nor do members invest sufficient time and 
resources to effectively carry out their tasks in the CG. Critique that SNV 
BOAM’s low resource allocation to the oilseeds value chain, inordinate 
delays in fund release procedures, influence in the CG decision making, and 
lack of interest to include agendas other than those in the BAOM framework 
have affected members’ interest and commitment to play a role of active 
nucleus-group.  High exit and rotation.  
Motivation Fourfold: 1) the business opportunities it provides, such as meeting new 
buyers and suppliers (extrinsic); 2) the incentives provided by SNV BOAM 
as it has been inviting participants and offers technical and financial 
assistance (extrinsic); 3) the learning opportunities the platform offers and 
its overall role in promoting the oilseeds sector (both extrinsic and intrinsic 
); and 4) personal interests (intrinsic).  DSA not objective in itself, but 
necessary precondition for poorly capacitated regional organisations. 
Roles & Contrib. No. Except for those contracted by SNV BAOM, formal duties and 
responsibilities of each CG member not specified.  
Shared resources No, but equal access to third (SNV BOAM) funds.  
1.2 Jointness  
Decision making Joint, to variable degrees. Stakeholders can adapt SIPs. For a limited period, 
stakeholders had a say in oilseeds allocated funding. Nevertheless, SNV 
BOAM influential in decision making. Equal opportunity to speak out for all, 
but more knowledgeable and well informed participants take advantages in 
the CG meetings.  
Leadership Stable and committed leadership; the Chain Leader elected at the first CG   
meeting is still willing and committed to lead the CG. He has good 
knowledge and vision for the sector. Nonetheless, he did not initiate and 
invest his time and resources to explore alternatives to promote the 
development of the sector. Disincentive due to absence of highly committed 
CG members’ and weak associations. 
Selection of 
stakeholders 
Profession and potential contributions to the CG are basic selection criteria. 
Leading Trio of SNV BOAM (centre of gravity), Chain Facilitator & CG 
Leader. Members modestly satisfied with selection. 
Agenda setting Leading Trio of CG Leader, Chain Facilitator, & SNV BOAM Chain Lead 
Advisor. Influencing agenda by others is difficult. Critique that agenda 
points are not accepted if not in line with SNV BOAM. Members modest-
highly satisfied with agenda. 
Benefits distribution In principle, all have equal access. But actual benefits depend on capability to 
articulate interests, and capabilities are not equally distributed among 
members. Critique that application procedures for project funding are not 
uniformly applied to all members. 
Risk sharing No risk members in meetings – not relevant. 
1.3 Transparency  
Accountability Formal accountability mechanisms absent. Nevertheless, several forms of 
informal accountability are present. 
Trust-building Yes; regular and direct communication and dialogue between stakeholders in 
the CG meetings have generally improved trust among stakeholder in and 
along the chain. More information on who does what and how to create 
business between chain actors. However, processors and exporters still 
distrust farmers. The CG had only little influence in this regard. 
1.4 Goal alignment  
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Objectives clear Yes, CG members have commonly shared objectives on promoting linkages 
between stakeholders in the oilseeds value chain. Objectives initially drafted 
by SNV BAOM. 
Win-win In principle. Win-win opportunities are equal but members need capabilities 
to gain from the MSP, and some are more capable than others.  
Compelling case Yes. The sector was in complete disarray due to lack of policy attention and 
disorganized chain actors. NGO successfully facilitated tri-sector approach. 
II. Embeddedness  
Link to CG Yes, pre-existing inter-organizational links have also helped to find new 
participants. Most of the participants however, were invited to the CG 
through SNV BAOM. 
Membership to  new 
organization 
No, the majority believed that the CG did not play any role in this regard. A 
few emphasised the role of the CG in establishing a complementary public-
private partnership on oilseeds.  
Multiple MSPs Yes, several members involved in other (BOAM) MSPs and PPPO. This 
improves network opportunities for CG members. 
Relations with 
government 
Yes, though key decision and policy makers are not yet attending the CG 
meetings, the CG has generally increased government’s interest in and 
attention to oilseeds sector. 
SNV BOAM 
embeddedness 
Yes, SNV BOAM embedded into several international development 
networks that also linked the CG members in a wider institutional field.  
III. Involvement  
Representation Incomplete. Not all key stakeholders are represented. Government 
institutions are represented by frequent rotating experts; key decision and 
policy makers are not participating in the CG meetings.  
Participation CG sub  
committees 
Yes, notwithstanding the limitations in carrying out assigned 
responsibilities, several members are participating in different committees 
(spontaneous, ad hoc and standing).  
External dynamics 
IV. Institutions  
Access to knowledge Yes, in respect of training, information and access to improved seeds, 
awareness on quality issues. No, in respect of making available new means of 
production and processing technology.   
Access to capital No, no changes achieved. Commercial Banks offer no accessible loans while 
MFIs charge exorbitant rate. Major limitation of CG. Increased attention to 
oilseeds sector (and government interest) may improve creditworthiness 
oilseeds chain actors. 
Access to markets Limited. Few direct linkages between producers and processors; domestic 
market is still broker dominated. Efforts of CG and PPPO to promote 
Ethiopian oils in Europe and Middle East, but no concrete result.  
Access to (third)  
organisations 
Limited. CG helped establishment of parallel public private partnership 
forum on oilseeds.  
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4. Institutional change 
This chapter elaborates on the CG’s external dynamics, the institutional changes in the 
value chain’s business environment brought about by the CG. We address the question 
to what extent the CG has been effective in improving the conditions for upgrading for 
farmers and SMEs in the oilseeds and edible oil value chain, in the perception of the 
interviewees. The focus is on opportunities for value chain actors to acquire knowledge 
and technology, capital or credit, opportunities to stabilize markets, and to become part 
of professional associations. Table 16 below presents an overview of perceptions by 
knowledgeable interviewees.  
 
Table 16. Perceived changes in the institutional environment, in % and number of 
interviewees 
 - % +/- % + % Total 
4.1 Access to knowledge and technology        
Training in good agricultural & manufacturing 
practices  
0 
 
0 11 92 1 8 12 
Farmers’ awareness on quality 2 22 4 45 3 33 9 
Oil millers’ awareness on quality 6 75 2 25 0 0 8 
Availability of improved seeds  0 0 13 100 0 0 13 
Availability of new technology 4 40 6 60 0 0 10 
Reduction in adulteration (oilseeds and edible oil) 7 64 4 36 0 0 11 
 
4.2 Access to capital - % +/- % + % Total 
Willingness of banks/MFI’s to finance 11 76 3 24 0 0 14 
 
4.3 Access to markets - % +/- % + % Total 
Increased prices paid by buyers 9 69 3 23 1 8 13 
Advance payment 8 73 3 27 0 0 11 
 
4.3 Access to organisation - % +/- % + % Total 
Access to new organisation 11 85 2 15 0 0 13 
Key:  - No effect of CG,  -/+ Limited positive effect of CG, + Considerable positive effect of CG 
4.1 Access to knowledge 
Access to knowledge refers to market, technical, and/or organisational information that 
value chain actors can acquire either by themselves or by hiring affordable service 
suppliers. To what extent have the CG meetings facilitated oilseeds chain actors in their 
access to such knowledge? Has the CG been indispensible in this respect? 
The CG has created access to technical, market and organizational information in 
several ways. All interviewees pointed out that the CG has facilitated training 
opportunities for farmers and oil mill workers to some extent. Farmers have been 
trained in good farming practices as well as on product diversification. Good farming 
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practices included trainings on land preparation, sowing, weeding, harvesting, and store 
management aimed at improving quality and productivity of oilseeds cultivation 
(interviews 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 17). The introduction and training of 5,000 farmers in 
growing olive trees and producing olive oil was the first set of activities related to 
product diversification (interviews 12, 16 and 17). The training of farmers in growing and 
collecting petal from safflower is another important activity in this regard.  Safflower’s 
petal is a high value export product from which farmers can make a proper living. 
Farmers who grow safflowers benefit not only from the petal but also from the seeds 
(interviews 10, 12, and 17). Training of oil mill workers in improved manufacturing 
practices is another opportunity the CG has created (interviews 9, 11, 12, and 17). 
Interviewees however, have emphasized the limited scale of the trainings provided and 
hence, its limited impact on quality and productivity of oilseeds and edible oil. For 
example, a representative of a farmers’ cooperative union stated that only 2,400 out of 
the 19,000 members of a Farmers’ Cooperative Union, had a chance to be trained 
(interview 5).  
The CG has also been criticised for its weak effort in facilitating technological 
transfer to the processing industries (interview 9).  On the production side however, it 
has facilitated access to improved seeds. Farmers’ cooperative unions are provided with 
information where and how to obtain improved seeds for their members. Training 
opportunities for farmers on informal seed multiplications72 is another important role of 
the CG (interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, and 17). Exchange of contact addresses between CG 
members has also facilitated access to technical information. For example, the Local 
Capacity Builder contracted by SNV BOAM has provided technical advisory services to 
cooperative unions whom he met in the CG meetings (interview 6).  
 On top of these, presentations of research findings and good practices have 
played important roles in creating access to technical and organizational information 
(e.g. interviews 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 13). For example, Addis Mojo Edible Oil Complex S.C 
presented on how to produce different varieties of edible oil using different processing 
technologies (interview 11). Reviews of the minutes of the oilseeds CG meetings 
generally indicate that presentations on research findings and sharing of good 
(agricultural and manufacturing) practices are among the most important agenda items 
of the CG meetings.  These items were absent in just two of the seventeen meetings.  
 4.2 Access to capital 
Access to capital involves the possibilities for oilseeds value chain actors to acquire 
credit, loan or budget for their commercial activities. Access to capital was assessed 
through interest rates, duration, collateral requirements, pay-back conditions, and 
characteristics of the funding organisation. It was also verified whether the CG was 
indispensable in influencing the stakeholders’ opportunities to access capital/credit.  
 Almost all interviewees pointed out lack of access to capital or credit services as a 
major bottleneck to the development of the oilseeds’ sector. Neither producers nor 
processors have enough collateral to secure loans from the Banks. In fact, most farmers 
do not have the collateral Banks require; hence, they heavily depend on MFIs (interview 
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4, and 5). Interviewees specified that farmers’ cooperative unions have better access to 
credit than individual farmers. Cooperative unions in Oromia for example, can borrow 
from the Oromia Cooperative Bank without collateral since they are shareholders of the 
Bank.  Unions borrow from the Bank at the rate of 7.5 percent per annum and lend73 to 
their members (farmers) at the rate of 8.5 percent (1 percent administrative cost). 
Interviewees however, believe that unions receive insufficient credits from the 
Cooperative Bank to meet the demands of their members. Hence, both individual 
farmers as well as cooperative members are exposed to exorbitant interest rates (16-20 
percent) charged by MFIs (interviews 4 and 5). A representative of the processors’ 
association stated that processors are in quest of large 
investment capital to upgrade the backward processing 
technologies, but Bank credit services are inaccessible 
due to collateral requirements. In addition, MFIs refuse 
to provide large amounts of credits (interview 9). 
Reviews of minutes of the oilseeds CG meetings 
show that Banks and MFIs have been participating since 
meeting 7 and 13 respectively. This shows that the CG 
members have been aware of the problem and the need 
for facilitating access to credit services. Generally, 
interviewees are very critical of the CG’s role in this 
regard. Many agree that the issue has been raised and 
discussed several times, but the CG’s role did not go 
beyond “talking”. Neither Banks nor MFIs have changed 
their polices and conditions for acquiring loans. The 
overall evaluation shows that eleven out of the fourteen 
interviewees with whom the issue was discussed said the 
CG did not positively affect the willingness of Banks and 
MFIs in Ethiopia to lend any money to stakeholders in 
the oilseeds value chain (Table 16).   
4.3 Access to markets 
Access to markets was examined by gathering information on (alternative) market 
opportunities, prices, and buyer and farmer commitments (advance payments, 
contractual arrangements, and quality standards).  
In terms of creating (alternative) market opportunities and B2B relationships, the 
CG has facilitated access to market and business information by creating opportunities 
for exchange of contact and communication between producers and 
processors/exporters. For example, Didea Farmers’ Cooperative Union has been able to 
establish direct connections with processors through the contact it established with the 
Addis Ababa Oil Millers’ Association. Didea was also able to establish linkages with an 
international company (based in London) to export linseed. The relationship however, 
did not materialize into concrete business due to the high local prices and low 
                                              
73 Cooperative unions provide the loan to farmers in kind (seeds) 
SNV BOAM aims at 
delivering B2B support to 
guarantee that a reliable 
supply and market outlet is 
assured. In their opinion, 
facilitating the 
development of business 
relationships and 
arrangements between 
downstream traders, 
processors and farmer 
organizations on one side 
and small farmers and their 
organizations on the other 
side is essential for 
business development. 
Source: SNV BOAM’s value chain 
approach. 
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international prices for linseed74. The provision of technical advisory services to unions 
by the Local Capacity Builders is another good example of the role of the CG in creating 
business relations (interview 5 and 6). On top of creating a contact platform, the CG has 
also facilitated international market access. An attempt was made to link Ethiopian 
companies with Dutch companies operating in the oilseeds value chain to facilitate 
access to market and technology information (interviews 16 and 17). The CG’s effort in 
exploring and securing markets (in China) for rapeseeds bi-products (cake) is worth 
mentioning as well. Samirawit Oil Mill Factory has already started exporting rapeseed 
cake to China (interview 17). The CG and the PPPO are closely collaborating with the 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Agency in promoting Ethiopian oilseeds to foreign 
markets (e.g. Europe and Middle East) (interview 12). Regardless of these efforts, many 
of our interviewees believe that the CG’s role in influencing prices through improved 
market information is minor (Table 16). The facilitation of access to market information 
is limited in scope and hence, direct exchange of market information and contact 
between producers and 
processors/exports is not yet 
effective; the oilseeds market is still 
dominated by brokers. Therefore, 
farmers have limited alternative 
markets (interviews 5, 6, 7, and 10). 
“Generally, the CG focused more on 
the production side, but little on the 
marketing aspects” (interview 11).  
Interviewees’ evaluate the impact of 
the CG on prices paid to farmers as 
minimal (Table 16).  
The oilseeds market is 
characterized by a high degree of price 
fluctuation (e.g. interviews 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 
11, and 12, see also textbox). Seasonal 
supply of oilseeds, extended supply 
chains characterised by few direct 
linkages between producers and 
processors/exporters, and speculative 
and dominant brokers are the main 
causes of price fluctuations. Lack of 
infrastructure to reach 
producers/farmers also causes a major 
problem (interview 12). Speculative 
brokers cause artificial (not dictated 
by actual demand and supply) price 
fluctuations. Almost all interviewees 
                                              
74 Clarification interview with the SNV BOAM Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 15 March 2011 
Prices in the oilseeds sector are defined by 
seasons and brokers. Usually, price diminishes 
during peak production season (November –
March) and tends to increase in the months of 
April –June. It increases sharply in the months of 
July-October (interview 4, 5 and 9). In spite of 
these general trends, brokers cause an increase in 
price by hording oilseeds (interviews 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 
and 14). They also use new economic or policy 
measures as pretext to increase price above the 
real impact of the measures taken.  For example, 
in August 2010, the value of the US $ has 
increased up to 22 percent due to the devaluation 
of the Ethiopian Currency (Birr). Immediately, 
the price for oilseeds increased up to 40 percent 
(interview 12). Brokers can also cause a decline in 
price. They usually collide to fix the farm gate 
price at low levels (particularly during peak 
production season) (interviews 4 and 5). In 2009, a 
cooperative union bought a quintal of rapeseed 
for Birr 470 which declined to Birr 370/quintal 
in one month time. This forced the union to store 
its products until prices reach at least the buying 
level (interview 4). More than competitive market 
forces, such ups and downs are caused by brokers 
(interviews 4 and 12). Of course, price generally 
increases from year to year due to inflation as 
well (interviews 11 and 12). 
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indicated that brokers, who muddle between producers and processors/exporters, are 
price makers at all times.  The CG had played a limited role in addressing considerable 
constraints such as limited direct market information and absence of linkages between 
producers and processors/exporters. Processors and exporters heavily depend on 
brokers since they still distrust smallholder producers and cooperative unions in 
ensuring predictable and regular supply of oilseeds (interviews 4, 9, 11, and 12).  
As stated above, the CG in collaboration with the PPPO is exerting its effort to ensure 
that the oilseeds pass through the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange market system, 
which is believed to improve the prices paid to farmers by improving market 
information as the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Agency provides daily updated 
information via television and radio. Sesame has already started going through such a 
market system (interviews 12 and 18).  
In terms of contractual agreement, the majority of the interviews pointed out 
that the issue has been raised and discussed in the CG meetings, but no concrete result 
has so far been achieved. The Lead Chain Advisor stated that there was an initiative of a 
formal contractual agreement between the Ambo Farmers’ Cooperative Union and the 
Samrawit Oil Factory, but it did not materialize due to the Union’s failure to supply the 
required amount of oilseeds (interview 17). Buyers generally distrust suppliers since the 
latter have no capacity to ensure predictable and regular supply (interviews 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 15, and 16).  Three of our interviewees pointed out the existence of contractual 
agreements between farmers and seed suppliers, but not attributed to the CG. 
Cooperative unions supply improved seeds to farmers and the latter pay back the 
equivalent value in kind (seed) during harvest season (interviews 4 and 5). ERA Agrolink 
PLC has also been engaged in similar arrangements (interview 14). Nevertheless, the 
contracts are challenging since numerous farmers break the contract (they do not 
supply as per the agreement) and it is difficult to enforce the contracts (legal procedures 
endure endlessly) (interviews 4, 5 and 14). Despite the challenges, the majority of our 
respondents believe that direct linkages and contractual agreements between producers 
and processors/exporters “are the only way out” in improving broker dominated 
oilseeds markets. The paradox is that farmers/suppliers receive insufficient payments in 
a situation where there is critical shortage of supply. Processors pointed at inadequate 
amounts of oilseeds supply throughout the year. As a consequence, they procure large 
stocks of oilseeds during the peak harvest season resulting in high holding costs. Even 
with this strategy, numerous processors still suffer from critical shortages and some 
“have been forced to engage in commercial oilseeds farming while others are forced to 
operate below their capacity” (interviews 10 and 11). Processors’ engagements into 
commercial farming would stretch their resources and capacity which in turn would 
undermine their capacity to invest and specialise in processing. 
Processors and exporters suffer from poor quality of oilseeds. Nor are there 
efficient quality standards to control quality (interviews 9, 10, 11 and 12). Although the 
QSAE was identified as a top-10 central player in the social network analysis, 
interviewees did not recognize the indispensability of QSAE, nor did SNV BOAM. 
Quality problems are not limited to oilseeds but also to vegetable/edible oils. Most of 
the local oil millers produce crude oil and on top of this, adulteration is a common 
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practice (interview 8). Therefore, the processing industry is less competent in the 
domestic market let alone to the export market. The CG has been promoting the 
concept and practice of quality for a better market share. Related to the limited capacity 
of domestic processors, no concrete results were booked yet in an attempt to create 
linkages with Dutch Processing Companies from whose experiences local producers 
could benefit (interviews 16 and 17). The CG has also promoted consumers’ awareness on 
the quality of edible oils through the involvement of an active Consumers’ Protection 
Association (interview 17).   
4.4 Access to organisation 
As already discussed in section 3.2(b), most of the interviewed participants indicated that 
the CG did not contribute to members’ access to new professional/sectoral 
organisations. Few believed that the CG has played an active role in establishing a 
parallel public private partnership on oilseeds. Eighty five percent of the interviewees 
believe that the CG has no contribution in this regard (Table 16).  
 
5. The future of the oilseeds CG 
The interviewees believe that the CG has been effective in bringing multi-stakeholders 
together and to identify and discuss major problems and policy gaps in the oilseeds 
value chain. As discussed in section 3.1.3, the issue of succession or handing over the CG 
from SNV BOAM to stakeholders has been discussed since meeting 14. Accordingly, 
though no practical activity can be observed so far, ECCSA had been assigned to take 
over responsibility. The majority of the interviewees however, are doubtful on ECCSA’s 
capacity to effectively perform this responsibility. Hence, the CG is unlikely to sustain 
its functions without SNV BAOM support (interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 15).  
The SNV BOAM’s Chain Lead Advisor confirmed these statements. He doubts whether 
the CG has a chance to continuation without SNV BOAM’s support. For example, many 
CG members from remote areas will not be able to attend the CG meeting as they do 
not have financial capacity to cover transportation and accommodation costs nor is the 
ECCSA capable of covering their costs (interview 17). 
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6. Conclusions 
Ethiopia has a considerable potential for growing different types of oilseeds, including 
linseed, Niger seed, soybeans, cotton seed, sesame, groundnuts, safflower seed, castor 
beans, and rapeseed. Most of these general and speciality oilseeds (safflower, castor 
beans and rapeseeds) have high international demand due to their organic nature. The 
oilseeds sector in Ethiopia is however, constrained by several factors which could be 
grouped into three (production, processing and marketing) areas. First, production is 
dominated by smallholder farmers who suffer from lack of inputs and low yields; hence, 
they have low economic incentives to invest in oil crops. Nor is there sufficient 
government attention and interest in the oilseeds sector to support farmers through 
research and supply of inputs. Second, the processing industry suffers from backward 
technologies and critical shortages of supplies (oilseeds). The majority of the local edible 
oil processing companies have no refinery systems and are predominantly characterized 
by inefficient and poor quality (crude oil) production.  Regrettably, many of the local oil 
millers operate below 40 percent of their capacity due to the critical shortage of oilseeds.  
Next to quality problems, domestic production covers only 20 percent of the total 
domestic demand for edible oil. As a result, the local market is dominated by imported 
palm oil, which further undermines the competitiveness of the local processing 
companies. Third, the oilseeds markets in Ethiopia are characterized by absent 
competitive environments resulting in prices being determined by speculative brokers 
rather than by buyers and suppliers (producers). Absence of direct linkages and 
communication between buyers and suppliers (producers) due to lack of efficient market 
information and trust are key problems.    
The oilseeds CG, which involved actors from the three different societal sectors 
(public, private and civil society), was established in 2005 by the NGO –SNV to address 
the above constraints through joint efforts. This case study assessed the effects of the 
oilseeds CG in improving the situation related to major problems in production, 
processing and marketing. Up to 101 organisations participated in at least one of the 17 
CG meetings that were held in the period of 2005-2010. To examine the MSP’s success, 
the researchers analysed both its internal, organisational dynamics and its external 
dynamics, i.e. the changes brought about in key areas of the institutional business 
environment. 
 
Establishing the oilseeds Coordination Group under SNV’s Support to Business 
Organisations and their Access to Markets’ (BOAM) programme was a timely and 
relevant response to pressing issues in the oilseeds sector. There was a need for an 
instrument that could facilitate public-private dialogue and strengthen the capacity of 
the sector. Contact building and networking among chain stakeholders is a necessary 
condition for a value chain to develop. The CG under study served as a new, horizontal 
platform and has played a significant role in creating opportunities for stakeholders in 
the edible oil and oilseeds value chains to unite and discuss on problems in the sector.  
The process of setting up the multi-stakeholder platforms was thoroughly 
considered: SNV BOAM has specified a vision on why and how private sector 
development can stimulate economic growth that reduces poverty; the oilseeds CGs 
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devoted proper attention to a collective goal setting process and CG participants could 
adjust common objectives, strategic intervention- and operational plans; the CGs are 
horizontally organised and from 2009, stakeholders had a say in the sector allocated 
funding through the CG Executive Committees. Moreover, a number of SNV BOAM 
initiatives have been supportive in ‘levelling the playing field’ for stakeholders. First, 
the meetings are currently in Amharic, the language that all stakeholders understand. 
Therefore, all stakeholders, including farmers, had a (equal) say in the meetings. Second, 
the DSA reimbursement has been functional in ensuring participation of poorer 
organisations and actors from remote areas for whom travel and accommodation costs 
were a real barrier to participation. Finally, in principle, every stakeholder is welcome to 
participate in the open and transparent CG meetings. 
 
In-depth analyses on the internal dynamics of the oilseeds CG demonstrate 
mixed results in the areas of important collaboration requirements and success factors. 
Motivations to engage in the CG are diverse, nonetheless, often related to financial and 
technical incentives (extrinsic) provided by the SNV BOAM’s broader programme. DSA 
coverage (transport and accommodation) is a necessary precondition to sustain 
participation from less capacitated organisations, but is not considered to be a 
motivational factor in itself.  
The general level of engagement of the CG members was rated modest. Except 
for those contracted by SNV BAOM, participants do not have clearly defined roles nor 
are they highly committed. An active and highly committed nucleus-group of 
participants is absent in the oilseeds CG. Absence of strong private company to take the 
lead is one of the factors that affected the emergence of an active nucleus-group. The 
CG members’ lack of interest and effort to invest sufficient time and resources as 
revealed by high exit and rotation of participants and weak performance of assigned 
tasks is another problem. SNV BOAM’s low resource allocation to the oilseeds value 
chain, inordinate delays in releasing funds to beneficiaries, influence in the CG decision 
making, and its refusing to include agendas other than those in the BAOM framework 
have affected members interest and commitment to play the role of an active nucleus-
group.   
Most of the respondents believe that decisions made are based on consensus. 
Nevertheless, one interviewee disagrees. Despite this, the CG has emerged as a 
democratic platform that basically functions on the principles of lateral relationships 
where each member is free and equal to participate. The CG operates under the 
leadership of a trio consisting of the CG Leader, the SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor 
and the CG Facilitator. They play a key role in identifying and inviting new 
participants, agenda setting and overall facilitation of the CG activities. But findings 
also revealed a prevalence of unequal power relationships. The fact that some agenda 
points forwarded by members were not accepted, and that proposal requirements were 
not uniformly and equally applied reflect unequal power relationships.  A representative 
of a processors association believes that SNV BAOM has the upper hand in setting 
agendas while other members are mainly on the ‘receiving end’. Such experiences 
undermine a sense of ownership. . In terms of distributions of benefits, information from 
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most of our respondents reflected that benefits are related to the capacity of each 
member to articulate its needs. This has affected equitable distribution of benefits 
resulting in marginal benefits for incapacitated members. Moreover, some of the 
respondents revealed lack of consistency in reviewing and approving funding 
applications, which could have had an effect on the equitable distribution of funds.  
Assessments showed that the degree of transparency in the oilseeds CG is 
modestly to high. Members are clearly informed in advance of every meeting about 
agendas to be discussed. Moreover, meeting summaries and other documents of the CG 
(presentation materials and research findings) are shared with stakeholders. Formal 
accountability mechanisms however, are missing as there are no formal duties and 
responsibilities assigned to members. Nonetheless, informal forms of accountability 
were apparent. The CG has created an important opportunity for the multiple 
stakeholders to meet and discuss on common interests for improving the performance of 
the oilseeds sector. In addition to discussions in the meeting, CG members also have 
opportunities for bilateral discussions (e.g. between producers and processors, producers 
and exporters, producers and experts, processors and experts, etc.). Such interactive 
opportunities promoted trust and a ‘sense of complementarities’ between stakeholders, 
which were previously operating in a state of complete disarray. Next to this, processors 
and exporters do not yet have sufficient trust in the producers (farmers) due to the 
latter’s inability to ensure reliable and regular supply of oilseeds.   
There was a compelling cases for the oilseeds CG on the basis of which its 
objectives were defined. Win-win opportunities for all exist only in theory. Practically, 
members have different capabilities upon which benefits depend; some are more capable 
than others. Lack of uniform assessment of funding applications is another factor, which 
could undermine the win-win scenario. If members who invested less time and resources 
have the chance to qualify for the SNV BAOM’s support (due to their good 
relationships) compared to those who invested more time and resources in the 
preparation of concept proposals, the latter are on the ‘losing side’. 
In the social network analysis the major rotation in the oilseeds CG (70,2 % 
exits), the central roles of the leading trio (SNV BOAM, CG Leader, and CG 
Facilitator), the active involvement of the government and SNV BOAM’s private sector 
approach was confirmed.  
 
  Regarding external dynamics, a considerable contribution of the CG is that it 
enabled the creation of linkages between organisations that did not exchange 
information before the start of the meetings. SNV BOAM played the role of independent 
‘network broker’ and facilitated the establishment of Business to Business relations 
between stakeholders in the Ethiopian context. Moreover, it created a learning platform 
generating general and sector specific technical- and market information. The oilseeds 
CG was mainly credited for this role in creating access to knowledge. The training 
opportunities (for farmers and oil mill workers) and facilitation of access to improved 
seeds are among the most important contributions of the CG. Impact on productivity 
and quality however, is not evident yet due to the limited scope of the training 
opportunities.  
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Lack of access to capital or credit services is one of the major bottlenecks for 
producers, processors and exporters of oilseeds. Farmers and small scale producers do 
not have easy access to Banks due to rigid collateral requirements; therefore, MFIs are 
the only options resulting in dependence on the exorbitant interest rates they charge. 
The CG has achieved little or none to change the situation. Studies and discussions 
between participants of the oilseeds CG demonstrated the role of the oilseeds sector in 
the national economic development in general and poverty reduction in particular. This 
has generated increased government attention to and interest in the sector. This may in 
the future create opportunities for devising a new financing strategy to the sector. As 
regards to market opportunities, overall evaluations of the interviewees pointed out that 
the CG’s effort in improving access to alternative markets was insufficient. Effective 
linkages and contractual agreements between producers and processors/exporters do 
not exist yet. The market is still dominated by speculative brokers who deliberately 
distort prices in favour of them; producers are not paid yet sufficiently and hence, 
incentives to invest in quality and productivity are absent. 
Generally, the success of the oilseeds CG in providing practical solutions to the 
problems that called for its establishment is not yet satisfactory. Nevertheless, 
institutional change has to be seen in terms of larger and longer term transition 
processes and interviewees have clearly indicated that the CG is a vital platform to 
address the multiple constraints of the oilseeds sector and hence, has to continue. 
However, interviewees expressed their concerns on the oilseeds CG future without SNV 
BOAM’s support since there is neither an active nucleus-group nor is the stakeholder 
ECCSA –that was assigned to take over- seen as an organisation that possess the 
requisite capacity.  
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7. Limitations 
As is the inherent problem with any investigation of short duration into a complex 
subject, choices had to be made regarding what to take on board and what not. We 
experienced a challenge to separate the impact of the multi-stakeholder platform on any 
changes in the institutional business environment, apart from the SNV BOAM 
programme as a whole or from any other (policy) interventions. Especially when 
organisations already have established long term relationships with SNV BOAM, the 
clear cut distinction between services provided by SNV BOAM or through the CG is 
not easy. This ‘attribution problem’ is a limitation. It was crucial that we remained 
conscious on this challenge during all the interviews by probing and making 
assumptions explicit; however –as expected- some interviewees remained having 
troubles in making this distinction.  In addition, it was questioned whether, for example, 
the acquired technology services or credit services were being made available from 
‘inside the chain’ (by chain actors) or ‘outside the chain’ (e.g. chain supporters).   
Second, during the field work the researchers operated in close collaboration 
with SNV BOAM and were partly dependent on SNV BOAM for their selection of 
interviewees. Though this substantially facilitated logistics and minimized non-
response, such embeddedness holds the risk of losing independency in the eyes of 
interviewees. Organisations might shy away from reflecting critically on the oilseeds 
CG as they fear the continuity of their good relationship with SNV BOAM. To avoid 
bias, a stakeholder exiting the CG as a result of a conflict was explicitly incorporated in 
the interview sample. Furthermore, the researchers constructed a list of relevant 
stakeholders in advance to ensure independent sampling. Finally, in the beginning of 
each interview the independent status of the researchers was emphasized.   
Finally, the political context of Ethiopia was not explicitly taken into account in 
the primary (interviews) and secondary data collection (desk review), despite its 
importance in understanding how MSPs are organised and functioning. Secondary 
source indicate that there is no genuine multi-party democracy and tensions and 
pressures in Ethiopia’s polities are growing (International Crisis Group report, 2009). 
Furthermore, Human Rights Watch research (2010: 4) reports that “development aid 
flows through, and directly supports, a virtual one-party state with a deplorable human 
rights record” and that “the government has used donor-supported programs, salaries, 
and training opportunities as political weapons to control the population, punish 
dissent, and undermine political opponents—both real and perceived. Local officials 
deny these people’s access to seeds and fertilizer, agricultural land, credit, food aid, and 
other resources for development”. The researchers however, have not researched 
whether such political situations exist or not, and as well as the impact of the prevailing 
political situation on the data found. 
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Appendix 1: Theoretical model 
Collaborative
variables
Involvement
Embeddedness
Impact
MSP
MSP
Access to capital
Access to technology
Access to markets
Access to organisation
VCD
VCD
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Roles of various stakeholders 
 
Source: (based on) Hans Posthumus Consultancy, 2008 
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In general we distinguish four types of stakeholders: 
 
1) Chain actors 
 
Chain actors are the prime stakeholders who, at some point in the chain, own the 
product that is being created. They commonly buy a semi-finished product from chain 
actors upstream, add a certain value to it, and sell the enhanced product to buyers 
downstream. In the research farmers, producer firms, cooperatives, processing firms, 
collectors, traders, exporters etc. are included. 
 
2) Chain supporters 
 
Chain supporters are those that are outside the chain.  They supply goods or services to 
the chain actors, often they are distinguished as either financial providers (e.g. banks 
providing loans) 
or non-financial service providers (e.g. accountants or transporters).  In the research 
consultants, BDS providers, quality and standard institutes, microfinance, banks, funds 
(IMF), and agricultural research centers (not only temporary, but years of input, 
extension services, seed inputs etc.) are included. 
 
3) Chain influencers 
 
Chain influencers are those that influence the performance of the sub sector, its actors 
and their supporters. They influence the entire sub sector (and beyond) without 
performing an actor or supporters role: influencers (such as the ministry of commerce) 
determine (partly) the factors (such as investment climate). In the research business 
representative associations, Ministries, Chamber of Commerce, media, government 
implementing agencies (e.g. Cooperative Bureau, BoFED etc.) are included. 
 
4) Chain facilitators 
A temporary (catalyst) role by an organisation (often a donor funded project) to “grease” 
the chain machinery, either between the actors at the various levels or between the 
actors and their supporters, with objective to improve the performance of the entire 
chain and its actors (also commercially). Often NGOs with donor funding that finance a 
diversity of capacity building activities. In the research SNV BOAM, NGOs, University, 
and multilateral agencies (UN, WB) are included. 
 
CODING FOR EXCEL 
 
1=chain actor, 2 = chain supporter, 3 = chain influencer, 4 = chain facilitator 
Appendix 3: Interview schedule/ List of Interviewees for Oilseeds Value Chain 
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General 
 
June 9 & 10, 2010 Orientation visit75: Mr. Marc Steen, National Portfolio 
Coordinator and Head Value Chain Development, Mr. Piet 
Visser, learning coordinator for VCD and Mr. Mugessie 
Fikri, Monitoring & Evaluation and Documentation, SNV 
BOAM Ethiopia, Addis Ababa 
 
 
August 12, 2010 Discussion Group76: SNV BOAM Ethiopia staff: 
presentation research and discussion with Mr. Piet Visser, 
learning coordinator for VCD and Lead Advisor pineapple 
chain, Mr. Carlo Kuepers, Lead Advisor honey chain & 
Senior Advisor Market Linkages & Value Chain 
Development, Mr. Mugessie Fikri, Monitoring and 
Evaluation, Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Advisor oil seeds 
chain, Mrs. Mahlet Yohannes, Lead Advisor dairy chain, 
Nicholas Nyathi, program coordinator PSNP Plus program, 
Meskerem Shifera, BDS Development and Elenie Abraham, 
junior advisor, oil seeds and VCF 
 
September 9, 2010 Short progress discussion with SNV BOAM staff: Mr. Piet 
Visser, learning coordinator for VCD, Mr. Juergen Greiling, 
Senior Advisor Agroprocessing, Mr. Mugessie Fikri, 
Monitoring and Evaluation, Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead 
Advisor oil seeds chain, and Meskerem Shifera, BDS 
Development  
 
November 8, 2010 Clarification meeting and feedback from Mr. Piet Visser, 
learning coordinator for VCD and Lead Advisor pineapple 
chain 
 
March 15 and 22, 2011 Clarification meeting with Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead 
Advisor oil seeds chain 
 
March 23, 2011 Clarification interview with a representative of processors 
association (anonymous) 
 
March 23, 2011 Clarification interview with a representative of a private 
company (anonymous) 
 
                                              
75 By Mr. Jeroen van Wijk (MSM) at SNV BOAM head office (Addis Ababa). 
76 By Ms. Sarah Drost (MSM) & Mr. Fenta Mandefro Abate (Addis Ababa University) at SNV BOAM’s 
head office (Addis Ababa) (continuing for all interviews). 
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September 28, 2010 19th Coordination Group Meeting OS VC 
 
Interviews 
 Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Oilseed Value Chain Advisor, 
SNV BOAM Ethiopia, November 5, 2010 
 
 Mr. Dereje Chanie, Program Coordinator, Public Private 
Partnership on Oilseeds, November 5, 2010  
 
Mr. Dendena Chemeda, Head of the Agro-Processing 
Industry Development Department and Mr. Zergaw Zeleke, 
Team Coordinator of the Agro-Processing Industry 
Development Department, the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MOTI), August 30, 2010 
 
Mr. Abreham Dagne, Operation manager, Addis Mojo Edible 
Oil Complex S.C, October 21, 2010 
 
Mr. Lemma Gebeyehu, Private Consultant/ SNV BOAM 
Local Capacity Builder, October 18, 2010 
 
 Mr. Tefera Geletu, Training Officer, Oromia Cooperation 
Promotion Bureau, October 18, 2010 
 
Mr. Elias Geneti, Managing Director, Agro prom 
International PLC, and CG leader, OS VC, October 22, 2010 
 
Mr. Kassa Getu, General Manager, ERA Agrolink PLC, 
October 22, 2010 
 
Dr. Girma G/Medhin, Managing Director, EDGE Consult, 
and CG facilitator, OS VC, October 25, 2010 
 
 Mr. Kedir Neffo, General Manager, Oromia Seed Enterprise, 
November 4, 2010 
 
Mr. Kebede Seifu, General Manager, Didea Farmers’ 
Cooperative Union, September 28, 2010 
 
Mrs. Addisalem Shitaye, Owner, Addisalem Trading, 
October 20, 2010 
Mr. Gezahegn Tadesse, Senior Apiculturist and Livestock 
Expert of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
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Development (MoA) & President of the Ethiopia Beekeepers 
Association (EBA), August 17, 2010 
 
Mr. Mulugeta Tegegn, Secretary, Addis Ababa Oil Millers’ 
Association, October 20, 2010 
 
Mr. Endale Tekalign, Food Safety Expert, Ethiopian 
Consumers’ Protection Association, October 19, 2010 
 
Dr. Bulcha Woyessa, Highland Oil Crops Coordinator 
Holleta Agricultural Research Centre, October 22, 2010 
 
 Mr. Tamiru Wubie, Research and Advocacy Specialist, 
Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce Sectoral Association 
(ECCSA), August 19, 2010 
 
 Mr. Mohammed Yousuf, General Manager, Raya Wakena 
Farmers’ Cooperative Union, September 28, 2010 
 
 
Note: MOTI, MoA and ECCSA were interviewed for all value 
chains under study (oilseeds, pineapple, dairy and honey)  
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Appendix 4: Questionnaire 
 
Context 
Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) are increasingly recognized by researchers and 
practitioners as promising mechanisms for stimulating economies in developing 
countries. The so-called chain platforms can help to bring actors, operating directly or 
indirectly in the chain, together and realise common objectives through dialogue and 
cooperation. However, systematic research on their effectiveness and impact is scarce. 
Therefore, SNV BOAM Ethiopia and the Maastricht School of Management (MSM) / 
Partnerships Resource Centre (PrC) have embarked on a collaborative effort to evaluate 
a number of MSPs in which SNV BOAM Ethiopia is involved. MSM carries the 
responsibility for the research and final report. 
SNV77 is a non-profit, international development organisation, with extensive 
hands-on experience in their value chain approach. MSM’s Sustainable Development 
Center78 stands for expertise on sustainable economic development in emerging 
markets. MSM is partner in the Partnerships Resource Centre79, an open centre where 
academics, practitioners and students can create, retrieve and share knowledge on cross 
sector partnerships for sustainable development.  
 
Interview objectives 
This questionnaire serves to structure a series of interviews that will be conducted with 
actors in a selection of value chain Coordination Groups (CGs) in Ethiopa. Selected are 
CGs in four chains: honey & beeswax, dairy, oilseeds, and pineapple. The interview 
results will serve as the main input for an evaluation report that is due for 1st of 
February 2011. The results will be presented and discussed during a workshop in 
spring 2011. 
 
About the questionnaire 
The interview consists of three parts. Section A focuses on the (meetings of the) 
Coordination Group itself. Section B concentrates on the institutional changes brought 
about by the CG, whereas the last section C asks about your overall opinion of the CG. 
 
Contact: 
For questions and additional information please contact 
Ms. Sarah Drost, MSc. 
Sustainable Development Center 
Maastricht School of Management 
Email: drost@msm.nl 
                                              
77 SNV BOAM Ethiopia: www.SNV BOAMworld.org/en/countries/ethiopia/Pages/default.aspx 
 
78 MSM - SDC: www.msm.nl/1/1/uk/research/sustainable_development_center/ 
 
79 PrC: www.erim.eur.nl/ERIM/Research/Centres/SCOPE/Partnerships_Resource_Centre/About 
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Identification 
 
Name interviewee(s): 
Organisation: 
Position: 
Location: 
 
Interviewer: 
Date of interview: 
Place of interview:  
 
What are the main activities of your organisation in this value chain?  
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A Coordination Group (CG) 
 
A1. General introduction 
1. What is the main problem in the apiculture/dairy/fruit/oilseeds sector, according to 
you? 
 
A2. Engagement  
2. In what way are you/is your organisation engaged in the CG? (describe activities and 
roles: e.g., Facilitator, Leader, advisor, member of committee/working group)  
 
3. Since when are you involved in the CG meetings? (reasons for prolonged stay or exit) 
 
4. What motivated your organisation to join the CG? (e.g. daily allowance, influence, 
networking opportunities?) 
 
5. Do you feel all relevant stakeholders are represented in the CG? Why?  
 
6. How would you evaluate the level of commitment of CG members? 
A. Low 
B. Modest 
C. High 
Please explain 
 
A3. CG Governance  
7. Do you feel all CG members have an equal say during the CG meetings?  
A. Yes 
B. No. Who are the dominant members?) 
 
8. Do you feel that all members benefit equally of the CG interventions? (win-win 
situation or not?  
A. Yes 
B. No. Who gains most?). 
 
9. Are you generally satisfied with the way the CG meetings are being governed? 
A. No  
B. Yes, but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. What should change? 
 
[Honey]  
H.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Apiculture Board (EAB) and its regional 
chapters? 
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[Dairy]  
D.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Milk and Milk Products Association 
(EMMPA)? 
D.2 What is your opinion about the Dairy Business Hub Model established in meeting 
16? 
 
[Oilseeds] 
O.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Pulses, Oilseeds, and Spices Processors 
Exporters Association (EPOSPEA)? 
 
B Issues addressed by the CG 
 
10. Did you exchange contact information with other CG members? Has this lead to 
concrete actions/funding/other opportunities in your field of activities? 
 
B1. Access to services  
11. Do you require specific information, technology or organisational services, for 
example to meet quality standards, to increase productivity, or to improve your 
management skills?  
A. No  
B. Yes, but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain what type of services. 
 
12. Have you been able to acquire sufficient service support?  
A. No  
B. Yes, but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain by whom and in what form?  
 
13. Did the CG improve the availability of these services to you? 
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. 
 
B2. Access to capital/credit 
14. How difficult is it for you to acquire a loan/credit/budget for making investments in 
your organisation (e.g. through financial institute or through B2B relations). 
A. Not difficult  
B. Sometimes difficult  
C. Very difficult 
Please explain. 
 
15. Did the CG influence your opportunities to obtain a loan, credit, or additional 
budget?  
A. No or almost not 
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B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. 
B3. Access to markets 
 
(a) Prices 
15. How would you evaluate prices paid to the producers in the last 3 years (stability, 
highness, pre-harvest price set)?  
 
16. Did the CG influence prices (stability and level) paid to farmers? 
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. 
 
(b) Buyer / producer commitment  
17. Do buyers commit themselves to producers to buy their produce in advance of the 
production cycle (provided that quality conditions are met)?  
A. No  
B. Yes 
Please explain. 
 
18. In case of a contractual arrangement, do you think producers perform well in 
responding to buyer’s requirements in terms of: delivery, punctuality of delivery, 
quality, and flexibility? 
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. 
 
19. Do producers have alternative market opportunities? Which ones?  
If yes, what are the benefits of these alternatives for producers? 
 
20. Did the CG contribute to improvement of contractual arrangements between 
producers and buyers?  
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. 
 
B4. Access to organisation 
21. Are you a member of a professional organisation/platform? If yes, which? 
 
22. Did the CG contribute to the formation of this professional organisation? 
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. 
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23. Did the CG contribute to your access to your professional organisation? 
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. 
B5. Institutional environment (legal, government policy) 
 
24. Which are the (three) main legal/policy constraints that you have to cope with in 
the supply chain? 
 
25. Did the CG contribute to solve these constraints? 
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain. 
 
C. Future and overall opinion of the CG 
 
26. In your opinion, has the CG, overall, been a success? 
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain (which are the main successes, failures, weaknesses, strengths)? 
 
27. How could the CG play a bigger role for you? (i.e. really addressing their 
issue?/partnerships possibilities). 
 
28.  Do you feel that CG is recognized as an important governance mechanism by the 
stakeholders in this value chain?  
A. No or almost not 
B. Yes but only modestly   
C. Yes, significantly 
Please explain 
 
29. Future scenario: What are, in your opinion, the future prospects of the CG after the 
BOAM programme has finished? 
 
30. What would be necessary, apart from the CG, to tackle the problems in your sector? 
 
Thank you for your time and collaboration. 
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Appendix Questionnaire: Conditions for upgrading (scored by the respondent) 
 
- No effect of CG 
-/+ Limited positive effect of CG 
+ Considerable positive effect of CG 
 
Access to knowledge & technology 
Training in good agricultural & manufacturing practices 
Farmers’ awareness on quality 
Oil millers’ awareness on quality 
Availability of improved seeds 
Availability of new technology 
Reduction in adulteration (oilseeds and edible oil) 
Other (please fill in) 
 
Access to affordable credit 
Willingness of banks/MFI’s to finance  
Buyer firms (B2B) are more willing to lend 
Other institutes more willing to lend 
Other (please fill in) 
 
Access to markets 
Increased prices paid by buyers 
Advance payment/contractual agreement 
Other (please fill in) 
 
Access to organisation 
Access to organisation (e.g. FBO, forum, representative agency) 
Other (please fill in) 
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Appendix 5: Course ratio oilseeds CG 
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Appendix 6: Betweenness centrality oilseeds CG 
 
Table 1 Top-10 central players in the oilseeds CG 
Name Normalised 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Type of 
Organisation 
Subtype Stakeholde
r role 
within VC 
(96) SNV BOAM 4.626 Civil society NGO / NGO 
network 
Facilitator 
(89) Quality 
Standard Authority 
of Ethiopia (QSAE) 
4.453 Government Implementing 
agency 
Supporter 
 
(74) Ministry of 
Trade and Industry 
(MOTI) 
3.994 Government National 
government / 
Ministry 
Influencer 
 
(6) Addis Ababa Oil 
Processing Mill 
Owners 
Association 
2.744 Private sector Business 
representative 
body / 
Association 
Influencer 
 
(79) Oromia 
Cooperative 
Promotion 
Commission 
(OCPC) 
2.652 Government Regional / 
Local 
government 
Influencer 
 
(48) FFARM 
Organic PLC 
2.589 Private sector Consultant / 
Consultancy 
Supporter 
 
(34) Didea 
Farmers' 
Cooperative Union 
2.581 Private sector Business 
representative 
body / 
Cooperative 
Actor 
(23) BCaD  
(Chain 
Facilitators) 
2.505 Private sector Consultant / 
Consultancy 
Supporter 
 
(5) Addis Ababa 
Chamber of 
Commerce Sectoral 
Association 
(AACCSA) 
2.484 Government Chamber of 
commerce 
Influencer 
 
(15) Agro Prom. 
International PLC 
2.409 Private sector Commercial 
enterprise 
Actor 
76 
 
(Chain Leader) 
 
Table 2 Central players in oil seeds CG with betweenness centrality > 2 
Name Normalised 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Type of 
Organisation 
Subtype Stakeholde
r role 
within VC 
(96) SNV BOAM 4.626 Civil society NGO / NGO 
network 
Facilitator 
(89) Quality 
Standard Authority 
of Ethiopia (QSAE) 
4.453 Government Implementing 
agency 
Supporter 
 
(74) Ministry of 
Trade and Industry 
(MOTI) 
3.994 Government National 
government / 
Ministry 
Influencer 
 
(6) Addis Ababa Oil 
Processing Mill 
Owners 
Association 
2.744 Private sector Business 
representative 
body / 
Association 
Influencer 
 
(79) Oromia 
Cooperative 
Promotion 
Commission 
(OCPC) 
2.652 Government Regional / 
Local 
government 
Influencer 
 
(48) FFARM 
Organic PLC 
2.589 Private sector Consultant / 
Consultancy 
Supporter 
 
(34) Didea 
Farmers' 
Cooperative Union 
2.581 Private sector Business 
representative 
body / 
Cooperative 
Actor 
(23) BCaD 
(Chain 
Facilitators) 
2.505 Private sector Consultant / 
Consultancy 
Supporter 
 
(5) Addis Ababa 
Chamber of 
Commerce Sectoral 
Association 
(AACCSA) 
2.484 Government Chamber of 
commerce 
Influencer 
 
(15) Agro Prom. 
International PLC  
(Chain Leader) 
2.409 Private sector Commercial 
enterprise 
Actor 
 
Table 3 Central players in oilseeds CG with betweenness centrality > 3 
Name Normalised 
Betweenness 
Type of 
Organisation 
Subtype Stakeholde
r role 
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Centrality within VC 
(96) SNV BOAM 4.626 Civil society NGO / NGO 
network 
Facilitator 
(89) Quality 
Standard Authority 
of Ethiopia (QSAE) 
4.453 Government Implementing 
agency 
Supporter 
 
(74) Ministry of 
Trade and Industry 
(MOTI) 
3.994 Government National 
government / 
Ministry 
Influencer 
 
 
Table 4 Central players in oilseeds CG with betweenness centrality > 4 
Name Normalised 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Type of 
Organisation 
Subtype Stakeholder 
role within 
VC 
(96) SNV BOAM 4.626 Civil society NGO / NGO 
network 
Facilitator 
(89) Quality 
Standard Authority 
of Ethiopia (QSAE) 
4.453 Government Implementing 
agency 
Supporter 
 
 
